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PROTECTING PROTECTED ACTIVITY
Daiquiri J. Steele*
Abstract: The United States Supreme Court recently rolled back protections in employment
retaliation cases by requiring plaintiffs to prove that their protected activity was the but-for
cause of adverse actions by their employers. As a result, employers may escape liability even
though the employee-plaintiffs have proven that employers had an impermissible motive in
taking adverse actions. In doing so, the Court undermined the underlying statutes’ retaliation
provisions created to help enforce the underlying statute, leading to a court-instituted failure
to protect activity that Congress sought to protect.
While legal scholars have paid much attention to the establishment of a but-for causation
requirement in retaliation claims brought under employment discrimination statutes, they have
paid less attention to other workplace statutes. This Article focuses on the transference of a
but-for causation requirement to cases involving retaliation under minimum labor
standards statutes.
The Article critiques judicial application of the but-for causation standard by explaining
the inconsistent outcomes that may result for similarly situated plaintiffs, by critiquing the
judiciary’s reliance on a purely private law, negligence-based model rather than appreciating
the role of minimum labor standards statutes as public law, and by demonstrating how
application of traditional canons of statutory interpretation support a causation standard lower
than but-for causation.
To remedy these problems, the Article suggests that courts should allow the common law
tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy—a tort that addresses the intersection
of public law and private law—to inform its interpretation of employment retaliation statutes
generally and minimum labor standards legislation in particular.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress adopts retaliation prohibitions as a primary mechanism for
enforcing statutory protections in all employment statutes. Though the
text of these provisions varies from one statute to another,1 the purpose is
the same—to fortify the other protections and entitlements created by the
statute. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the important
role retaliation provisions serve in enforcing the underlying statutes, and
the Court’s retaliation jurisprudence has reflected the import of this
function for over half a century.2 However, the Roberts Court changed
course from the Court’s former disposition of interpreting statutory
retaliation provisions broadly, and thus protecting employees and the
underlying statutory schemes.
Two pivotal Supreme Court decisions heightened the causation
1. Alex B. Long, Employment Retaliation and the Accident of Text, 90 OR. L. REV. 525, 561–63
(2011).
2. See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV.
375, 384 (2010); Michael J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The Retaliation Decisions,
60 S.C. L. REV. 917, 917–18 (2009).
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standards for employees bringing retaliation claims. Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc.3 and University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center v. Nassar4 established but-for causation as the standard for Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)5 cases and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)6 retaliation cases, respectively.
The opinions asserted that the use of the term “because” or “because of”
in the statutes reflects that Congress intended a but-for causation
standard.7 Both were 5-4 decisions, and both make it more arduous for
employee-plaintiffs to hold employers liable, even when the plaintiffs
have proven that employers used protected activity as a factor in making
the adverse employment decision. The Gross and Nassar opinions were
met with consternation from many legal scholars because of the
potentially disastrous impact on workplace law.8 Indeed, these Court
decisions have been used as part of a broader strategy of constricting
enforcement in workplace law and other areas.9
Instituting a heightened causation standard in retaliation cases makes it
more difficult for victims to hold employers liable. Given the private
enforcement schemes Congress has created for many employment
statutes, a rule that makes it more onerous to hold employers liable strikes
the wrong balance. Causation itself is a mechanism for limiting liability,
and the higher the causation standard, the more limited the employer’s
liability. This removes incentives for employers to ensure retaliation is not
occurring. More importantly, it may deter employees from exercising
statutory rights.
In Gross, Jack Gross, an employee of FBL Financial Services, Inc.,
brought an ADEA action against his employer alleging the employer

3. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
4. 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–633.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2 to -17.
7. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176; Nassar, 570 U.S. at 339.
8. Matthew A. Krimski, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar: Undermining
the National Policy Against Discrimination, 73 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 132, 132 (2014) (arguing
that the Court’s adoption of Nassar creates a rigid causation standard that inhibits the ability of
employees to prove retaliation claims); Catherine Donnelly, The Power to Retaliate: How Nassar
Strips Away the Protections of Title VII, 22 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 411, 419 (2016)
(noting that Nassar was decided contrary to the congressional intent behind the Civil Rights Act of
1964); Amber L. Kipfmiller, Examining Retaliation as a Use of Force: Why State Courts Should
Return to the Pre-Nassar, Pro-Plaintiff Framework, 87 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 1, 2 (2018); see also
Moberly, supra note 2, at 445 (warning two years before the Nassar decision that a but-for causation
standard would be “devastating to employees who blow the whistle on illegal conduct”).
9. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1009,
1014–16 (2020) (requiring plaintiffs in civil rights cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to plead
but-for causation and citing Gross and Nassar as support).
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demoted him because of his age.10 The lower court instructed the jury to
rule in Gross’s favor if he proved that his age was a motivating factor in
whether he would be promoted.11 Writing for the Court, Justice Clarence
Thomas noted that the ADEA made it unlawful “for an employer . . . to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s age.”12 The opinion stated that the term “because of” means
“by reason of” or “on account of,” and those terms necessitated that a
plaintiff prove that age was the but-for cause of the adverse action.13
Interestingly, the Court also noted that it “must be careful not to apply
rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and
critical examination.”14 Despite this pronouncement, the Court went
against its own advice in 2013 when it ruled in Nassar.15
Remarkably, when the Court granted certiorari in Nassar, there was no
circuit split on whether a mixed motive standard could be applied in
Title VII retaliation claims. Only two circuits, the Fifth and Eleventh, had
considered whether Title VII retaliation claims may proceed under a
mixed motive theory after Gross. Both answered in the affirmative. In
Smith v. Xerox Corp.,16 a female employee sued her employer for Title VII
retaliation alleging she was terminated after filing a charge with the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The Court held
that despite Gross, a mixed motive jury instruction was appropriate in
Title VII retaliation claims.17 In Saridakis v. South Broward Hospital
District,18 an unpublished Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, the
court agreed with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and held that Gross
was not controlling in Title VII retaliation cases.19 There was no dispute
among circuits regarding the applicability of the heightened causation
standard the Court espoused for ADEA retaliation cases to Title VII
retaliation cases. Nevertheless, the Court still granted certiorari in Nassar
and held but-for causation was requisite.
In Nassar, a medical doctor of Middle Eastern descent named Naiel
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Gross, 557 U.S. at 170.
Id. at 170–71.
Id. at 176 (emphasis in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)).
Id.
Id. at 174 (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008)).
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 324.
468 F. App’x 926 (11th Cir. 2012).
This case is cited for the sole purpose of demonstrating that no circuit split existed.
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Nassar filed multiple Title VII claims, including one for retaliation for
having previously filed a racial and religious harassment claim.20 Justice
Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that but-for causation
was the standard for proving retaliation under Title VII.21 With one
opinion, the Court added a heightened causation standard to a statute that
had been in effect for half a century.
While much of the scholarship concerning Gross and Nassar has
focused on their application to anti-discrimination statutes, this Article
adds to the literature by discussing a broader application of the statutory
interpretation principles used in those cases. It adds to the criticism of
Gross and Nassar and specifically argues that they should not be extended
to the retaliation provisions of minimum labor standards statutes. This
Article posits that the rationale underlying Gross and Nassar—that the
term “because” in § 2000e-3(a) and § 623(a)(1) should be interpreted by
courts as requiring but-for causation—is flawed.
Using the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA),22 the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA),23 the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),24 the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA),25 and the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)26 as
examples, this Article illustrates how application of a but-for causation
standard to minimum labor standards statutes would lead to inconsistency,
and in some instances, irrationality in the law. It critiques the judiciary’s
prioritization of the private law aspects of workplace statute retaliation
provisions over their public law nature in the interpretation of these laws.
In other words, it shows how the judiciary’s treatment of these retaliation
provisions as more like employment contracts concerned only with the
private relationship between employer and employee instead of
incorporating the public purposes of these provisions and their underlying
statutes is problematic. This is both a criticism of Gross and Nassar and a
reason for not extending their holdings to minimum labor standards
legislation. Lastly, this Article assesses the language of the retaliation
provisions using canons of statutory interpretation. It applies several
canons of statutory interpretation to illustrate that the application of the
canons supports a lower causation standard in minimum labor standards
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Nassar, 570 U.S. at 344–45.
Id. at 360.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.
Id. §§ 651–678.
Id. §§ 1001–1461.
Id. §§ 2601–2654.
38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4334.
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retaliation claims than but-for causation.
While Gross and Nassar have already drastically turned the tide of
retaliation jurisprudence in employment discrimination cases, the
decisions may have influence outside of the anti-discrimination realm.
Title VII is viewed by courts as the premier employment discrimination
statute, and many federal courts,27 state courts,28 and administrative
agencies29 align their decisions in cases involving other employment
discrimination laws with Title VII case law. Indeed, many courts have
already started applying the Gross and Nassar holdings to minimum labor
standards legislation.30
This Article argues against such application. The Court’s use of but-for
causation as the standard for remedial statutes is particularly problematic.
The purpose of causation requirements in cases is to limit defendant
liability. Doing so in situations in which Congress is using a retaliation
provision of a statute to undergird the duties and rights created in the
statutes impedes the purpose of the statute. Where an employer used a
motive explicitly forbidden by Congress, the employer should be held
liable. Any additional motives, besides the one expressly forbidden by
Congress, should be considered when determining remedy, not liability.
The entire purpose of minimum labor standards statutes is to provide

27. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120–21 (1985) (noting that
Title VII interpretations apply with equal force in the context of the ADEA); Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 44 (2003) (applying Title VII precedent to an Americans with Disabilities
Act case); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1185–86 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (applying Title VII’s McDonnell
Douglas framework to a claim under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub.
Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (referencing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64
(1986), a Title VII case, in determining that sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination under
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,
166 (1989) (stating that the Title VII disparate treatment framework applies to race discrimination
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Giles v. Transit Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 794 F.3d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (applying the Title VII framework to a claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974); Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 827 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming
the district court’s application of Title VII’s McDonnell Douglas test to a claim under the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008).
28. See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 445–46 (Tex. 2004) (stating
the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act is modeled after Title VII, and federal case law may be
cited as authority in cases relating to the state statute); Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs., 71 F.3d
1079, 1083–84 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act and Title VII are
construed consistently); Sch. Bd. v. Hargis, 400 So. 2d 103, 108 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(reasoning that Florida’s civil rights statute was patterned after Title VII).
29. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF FED. CONT. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, FEDERAL CONTRACT
COMPLIANCE MANUAL 83 (2020), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/OFCCP/FCCM/508_FCC
M_05012020.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G2C-2RU3] (noting the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Program’s policy is to interpret the nondiscrimination provisions of Executive Order 11246 consistent
with Title VII principles).
30. See infra section II.A.
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individuals or groups with the rights contained therein. If an employee
proves that their employer used the exercise of a statutory right as a motive
in an adverse employment decision, there should be some application of
the statute. The heightened but-for causation standard permits this
situation by allowing employers to escape liability for factoring in
protected activity when making adverse employment decisions, as long as
the employer can pair the impermissible motive with a permissible one.
Making this pairing is an easy task given the at-will employment rule.31
Moreover, moving from a motivating factor causation standard to a
heightened but-for standard transfers the burden of proof from the
employer, who bears the burden of proving the same decision defense, to
the plaintiff. Additionally, a heightened standard weakens the deterrent
effect of the laws.
This Article posits that transference of the Court’s interpretation of
“because” in employment discrimination statutes to minimum labor
standards legislation would lead to inconsistent, and in some cases,
irrational results. It argues that the Court’s reliance on common law
negligence theory to inform interpretation of an intentional offense is
problematic. The Article asserts that this is symptomatic of a larger
problem—courts treat employment retaliation disputes like they operate
solely in the private sphere and fail to recognize the larger societal impact
of retaliatory actions.
Part I describes the role of minimum labor standards legislation in labor
protection. It examines how labor regulation can improve productivity,
labor force participation, economic performance, and health outcomes,
not only for employees but for society as well. It also discusses the
prevalence of labor standard violation claims.
Part II describes the likely impact of Gross and Nassar on federal
minimum labor standards statutes. It examines the purpose and text of five
federal minimum labor standards legislation statutes and what causation
standard would be applicable if the Court’s rationale from Gross and
Nassar are applied to the statutes. Additionally, this Part details the
significance of consistency among federal labor standards legislation and
illustrates how the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has attempted to
attain consistency through its issuance of implementing regulations and
agency guidance.
Part III demonstrates how the Court’s interpretation is inconsistent
with the results obtained using ordinary canons of statutory interpretation.
It illustrates how their application to retaliation provisions in minimum
labor standards support a causal standard lower than but-for causation.

31. See infra Part IV.
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This Part explains the flawed attempt of the Gross and Nassar Courts to
apply the plain meaning rule and examines statutory interpretation canons
related to textual integrity and extrinsic source canons.
Finally, Part IV details the common law baselines against which
retaliation provisions in minimum labor standards statutes are interpreted.
This Part discusses the Court’s use of tort law in employment law
statutory interpretation to interpret workplace laws generally, and the
advantages and disadvantages of doing so. It also explains the
intersectionality of private law and public law in minimum labor standards
legislation and asserts that the Court should let the common law tort of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy inform its interpretation
of causation standards in retaliation provisions of minimum labor
standards laws. It provides an overview of the different causation
standards used in the various jurisdictions, and illustrates the
pervasiveness of a lower causation standard than but-for and reasons
supporting the dominance of a lower standard.
I.

FEDERAL MINIMUM LABOR STANDARDS LEGISLATION

This Part discusses the salience of minimum labor standards legislation
in labor protection and examines how labor regulation can improve
economic and health outcomes not only for individual employees but also
for society.
A.

Wage Protection

Until the Supreme Court’s case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish32 in
1937, governmental attempts to regulate wages and hours since the
mid-nineteenth century33 had been overturned by the courts as violating
the constitutional principle of freedom of contract.34 In 1938, Congress
passed the FLSA. The Act’s purposes include correcting and eliminating
“labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being

32. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
33. On March 31, 1840, President Martin Van Buren issued an Executive Order mandating a
ten-hour maximum workday at Navy yards. Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Martin van Buren,
Executive Order, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/201853
[https://perma.cc/4UDV-DYK5].
34. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52–53 (1905) (invalidating a New York law
regulating the hours bakers could work as unconstitutional because it interfered with freedom of
contract); Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 610–11 (1936) (declaring a New
York minimum wage law unconstitutional because the right to make contracts is a liberty protected
by due process).
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of workers.”35 The law establishes a federal minimum wage,36 prohibits
oppressive child labor,37 and institutes premium pay for overtime
hours worked.38
The FLSA has been amended numerous times since its passage, but the
most significant amendments have been the exclusion of pre-work and
post-work activities from compensable work time;39 the setting of a
two-year statute of limitations for all claims, except those arising from
willful violations which can be brought within three years;40 expanding
the number of employees covered by the Act through the creation of
enterprise coverage;41 extending coverage to most federal, state, and local
government employees;42 and requiring employers to provide reasonable
time periods for breaks for employees to express breast milk for a nursing
child.43 Additionally, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA),44 which prohibits
sex-based discrimination in pay, and the ADEA, which prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of age, were both passed as
amendments to the FLSA. Many of the FLSA amendments pertain to
increases in the federal minimum wage, which was $0.25 per hour when
the FLSA was originally passed in 1938 and has been at $7.25 per hour
since July 2019.45
The FLSA has historically been and remains a valuable instrument in
labor protection for millions of American workers. While there are many
definitions of “wage theft,”46 a general definition is the failure to pay the
35. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a).
36. Id. § 206.
37. Id. § 212.
38. Id. § 207.
39. Id. § 254(a).
40. Id. § 255.
41. The 1961 FLSA amendments established the concept of enterprise coverage, whereby coverage
is no longer based on whether an individual employee is engaged in commerce or production of goods
for commerce, but instead based on whether the employer has other employees engaged in commerce
or production of goods for commerce. The 1966 FLSA amendments expanded enterprise coverage.
GERALD MAYER, BENJAMIN COLLINS & DAVID H. BRADLEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42713, THE
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA): AN OVERVIEW (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R42713.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT7R-HC2N].
42. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55; 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(e).
43. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act amended the FLSA to provide for the
expression of breast milk. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119; 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
45. WILLIAM G. WHITTAKER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33791, POSSIBLE INDEXATION OF THE
FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE: EVOLUTION OF LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY (2008).
46. See Stephen Lee, Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 655,
656 n.8 (2014) (collecting definitions of “wage theft”).
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legal wages owed to a worker for work already performed. Wage theft can
take several forms, but common methods include failing to pay employees
at all, minimum wage violations, overtime violations, having employees
work “off the clock,” and illegal deductions from employee pay.47
A 2009 study48 found that out of 4,000 participating workers, 26% were
paid less than minimum wage in the week prior to the study and over 66%
had experienced some sort of wage theft (e.g., not being paid for all hours
worked, not receiving premium pay for overtime hours worked, and
having their tips stolen) in the prior week.49
While wage theft can affect all workers, it is particularly acute for
workers of color, women, and immigrants.50 Men experienced minimum
wage violations at a rate of 19.5%, while women experienced them at a
rate of 30.2%.51 The percentage of workers who had been victims of
minimum wage violations were 32.8% for Latinx workers, 19.1% for
Black workers, 15.1% for Asian workers, and 7.8% for White workers.52
There is some, but not much, variation in the rate of workers experiencing
wage and hour violations by age. Those ages eighteen to twenty-five and
over age forty-six had a rate of 27%, while individuals ages twenty-six to
thirty-five and thirty-six to forty-five had rates of 25.1% and 24.6%,
respectively.53 Foreign-born workers experienced wage and hour
violations at approximately twice the rate of their U.S.-born
counterparts.54
Wage and hour violation rates also vary by industry. In federal fiscal
year 2019, the industries with the highest number of employees affected
by wage and hour violations were food services, construction, retail,
health care, agriculture, and hotels.55 Agriculture, automotive repair,
apparel manufacturing, child care, security guard services, cosmetology,
hospitality, and janitorial services are also included among high

47. See Llezlie L. Green, Wage Theft in Lawless Courts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1303, 1308 (2019).
48. This study was conducted by the National Employment Law Project (NELP), University of
Illinois at Chicago, Center for Urban Economic Development, and UCLA Institute for Research on
Labor and Employment.
49. ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 2, 20 (2009), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ39-PJ7G].
50. Id. at 9.
51. Id. at 42.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., LOW WAGE, HIGH VIOLATION INDUSTRIES (2019)
[hereinafter LOW WAGE, HIGH VIOLATION], https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/data/charts/lowwage-high-violation-industries [https://perma.cc/5VCM-3KMJ].
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violation industries.56
Wage theft is occurring at such alarming rates that even though the
FLSA was enacted over eighty years ago, many states recently started
enacting state legislation that adds additional wage and hour protections.
In May 2019, Colorado enacted a law imposing criminal penalties on
employers who willingly refuse to pay wages.57 The law classifies the
failure to pay employee wages as “theft,” and provides for criminal
penalties in addition to any civil recourse.58 In 2019, Minnesota59 and New
Jersey60 also had laws go into effect that criminalize wage theft. The
Minnesota law is one of the toughest in the nation, imposing a fine
schedule of up to $35,000 and a prison sentence of up to twenty years.61
The New Jersey law also criminalizes wage theft and imposes fines of up
to $15,000 and a maximum prison term of five years.62
Employers often are able to violate wage and hour laws and avoid
consequences by deterring their employees from reporting the abuses. The
2009 NELP study discussed previously showed that 20% of workers
complained to their employer about wage and hour violations.63 Of these,
43% experienced retaliation from their employer.64 Of the workers that
had experienced a wage and hour violation that did not file any type of
complaint, half decided not to report the violations for fear of losing their
jobs or having even more wages stolen.65 Others did not do so because
they thought reporting the violations would be ineffective.66
While it is not as common as wage theft, child labor continues to be a
problem in the United States. Between 2003 and 2016, 452 children in the
United States died while working, seventy-three of whom were age twelve
or younger.67 These children were killed while working in the agriculture,
56. Id.
57. Theft-Human Trafficking–Compensation and Salaries, H.B. 19-1267, 72d Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Colo. 2019).
58. Id.
59. 2019 Minn. Laws 41 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 16C.285(3) (2020)).
60. S.B. 1790, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018).
61. 2019 Minn. Laws 41 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 16C.285(3) (2020)).
62. S.B. 1790, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018) (noting that wage theft is a third degree crime);
N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C-43-3 (2020) (stating that a third degree crime is punishable by up to a $15,000
fine); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C-43-6 (stating that a third degree crime is punishable by up to five years
in prison).
63. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 49, at 3; see also discussion supra note 48.
64. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 49, at 3.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Andrew Van Dam, 452 Children Died on the Job in the U.S. Between 2003 and 2016, WASH.
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construction, logging, manufacturing, retail, and transportation
industries.68 In fiscal year 2019, DOL had 858 cases, involving over 3,000
minors, in which it found child labor violations.69
Government enforcement of the FLSA is crucial because wage theft
and child labor violations continue. In fiscal year 2019, DOL found
minimum wage violations in 9,566 cases.70 This resulted in recovery of
over $39.5 million for affected workers.71 In the same fiscal year, DOL
had 11,018 overtime cases in which violations were found, resulting in
over $186.2 million in recovered wages.72 Statistics like these demonstrate
the ability of employees to recover for FLSA violations. However, these
statistics do not encompass the employees who receive all of their legal
pay because of the powerful deterrent effect of the FLSA.
B.

Occupational Safety and Health

There was a thirty-two-year gap between the passage of the FLSA and
the passage of OSHA, the next important federal statute governing labor
standards. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, state
governments paid much attention to workplace conditions. The states took
the lead on promulgating laws to protect workers from workplace hazards.
By 1890, twenty-one states had occupational safety statutes.73 Federal
response to deaths and injuries from workplace accidents was steady, but
slow. As was the case with many areas of federal regulation, the federal
government initiated its entrance into occupational safety and health
regulations through its purchasing power. In 1936, Congress passed the
Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, which regulated both wages and
safety for employers who were federal contractors.74 Thereafter,

POST (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/12/20/child-labor-deaths-ustwenty-first-century/#:~:targetText=About%20452%20children%20died%20as,their%20peers
%20in%20other%20industries [https://perma.cc/7CZZ-RPDD].
68. Id.
69. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., CHILD LABOR (2019) [hereinafter CHILD LABOR],
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/data/charts/child-labor [https://perma.cc/5UUB-DEWD]; LOW
WAGE, HIGH VIOLATION, supra note 55.
70. CHILD LABOR, supra note 69.
71. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2019) [hereinafter
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT], https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/data/charts/fair-labor-standardsact [https://perma.cc/3XXP-7EZJ].
72. Id.
73. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., REFLECTIONS ON OSHA’S
HISTORY 1 (2009), https://www.osha.gov/history/OSHA_HISTORY_3360s.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8D8L-G3XK].
74. 41 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6511.
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industry-specific occupational safety statutes were passed.75 Congress
enacted OSHA in 1970.76
Finding that workplace illnesses and injuries place a substantial burden
on interstate commerce, Congress promulgated occupational safety and
health standards. Since its passage, OSHA has been amended four times.
The amendments increased the maximum penalties for OSHA
violations,77 directed the Secretary of Labor to establish agreements with
the states to consult on safety and health matters,78 prohibited the
imposition of OSHA enforcement quotas by the DOL,79 and included the
U.S. Postal Service under OSHA’s coverage.80
In federal fiscal year 2018, DOL completed 32,023 inspections.81
Approximately 56% of these were unprogrammed inspections, which
include inspections based on employee complaints, injuries, fatalities, and
referrals.82 The remaining 44% were programmed inspections akin to a
compliance review.83 The importance of occupational safety has prompted
states to pass laws expanding the applicability of the standards contained
in OSHA. Twenty-seven states have extended OSHA coverage via state
statutes.84 One of them was Massachusetts, which passed a law in 2019
that made its state and local government employees subject to the same
standards contained in OSHA.85
C.

Employee Benefits
Congress enacted ERISA four years after passing OSHA.

75. See Federal Coal Mine Safety Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-552, 66 Stat. 692; Longshoremen’s
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-538, 72 Stat. 397 (1958); Federal Metal and
Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-577, 80 Stat. 772.
76. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 666).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 666.
78. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration Compliance Assistance Authorization Act
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-197, 112 Stat. 638 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 670), added this
provision to OSHA.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 657(h).
80. Id. § 652(5).
81. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., 2018 ENFORCEMENT
SUMMARY, https://www.osha.gov/dep/2018_enforcement_summary.html [https://perma.cc/KJ6VKLQD].
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 111th Cong. 1 (2009),
https://www.osha.gov/news/testimonies/10292009 [https://perma.cc/QN38-ASJD] (statement of
Jordan Barab, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Lab.).
85. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 149, § 6 1/2 (2020).
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Congressional findings that promoted the statute’s passage considered
employee benefit plans vital to the well-being.86 ERISA sets minimum
standards for employee welfare and pension benefit plans.87 The statute
also provides federal insurance for certain pension plans.88
There have been several amendments to ERISA since its original
implementation; only the most significant ones will be addressed here.
The Retirement Equity Act of 198489 amended ERISA to protect families
when women have to take extended absences from their jobs childbearing
by relaxing the rules regarding breaks in service.90 Additionally, the
amendment clarified the extent to which pension plans must comply with
state court divorce, separation, or child support orders concerning the
division of a participant’s retirement plan.91
Another major amendment to ERISA is the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA).92 This amendment required
plan sponsors to provide continued health coverage for employees and
their beneficiaries after termination of employment.93 A provision
requiring group health plans and insurers offering group health insurance
to provide a minimum forty-eight hour hospital stay to mothers following
a traditional delivery and at least a ninety-six hour stay following a
Cesarean section delivery was added to ERISA through the Newborns’
and Mothers’ Health Protection Act of 1996.94 Additionally, the Mental
Health Parity Act of 1996 amended ERISA to mandate that a group health
plan’s maximum benefit limitation may not be less for mental health
benefits than it is for medical and surgical benefits.95
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
amended ERISA to modify the rules concerning the use of preexisting
condition exclusions by group health plans and prohibiting such plans
from establishing enrollment rules based on health status, medical history,
previous claims, disability, or genetic information.96 In 2010, the Patient
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
87. See generally id. §§ 1021–1114.
88. Id. §§ 1301–1461.
89. Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 1052(b)(5)(A)–(E).
91. Id. § 1056(d).
92. Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 1161.
94. Id. § 1185; Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110
Stat. 2935.
95. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a).
96. See Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1191–
1191c).
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Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) amended ERISA to establish
minimum standards for employer-sponsored health plans.97 It also
imposed tax penalties on covered employers if they do not provide
affordable insurance to an appropriate proportion of their workforces.98
ERISA protections continue to play a vital role in protecting the
pension, health, and welfare benefits of America’s workers and their
beneficiaries. In federal fiscal year 2019, DOL recovered more than
$2.5 billion in direct payments to plans, participants, and beneficiaries.99
There were 1,146 civil investigations and an additional 275 criminal
investigations under ERISA.100 With respect to the civil investigations,
67% required DOL action to restore plan assets, provide benefits to
beneficiaries, recover profits made from illegal or wrongful conduct, and
reverse prohibited transactions.101 The criminal investigations led to the
indictment of seventy-six individuals.102
D.

Leave Entitlements

Almost twenty years after ERISA’s passage, Congress passed the
FMLA in 1993. The FMLA mandates that covered employers provide
twelve weeks of unpaid leave during any twelve-month period for an
employee who has given birth; has had a child placed with them for
adoption or foster care; is caring for a spouse, child, or parent with a
serious health condition; or is unable to perform the functions of his or her
position due to a serious health condition.103 Among the stated purposes
for the Act are balancing the needs of families with the demands of the
workplace and ensuring the economic stability of families.104 The
statutory entitlements provided for in the Act are imperative to employees
who may be suffering from serious health conditions themselves, are new
parents, or are caregivers. It does not guarantee any type of paid leave,
rather it guarantees that the employee will be able to return to their job
after the FMLA leave has expired.105 It also requires the employer to
97. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 1185d.
99. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., FACT SHEET: EBSA RESTORES OVER $2.5 BILLION TO EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PLANS, PARTICIPANTS AND BENEFICIARIES 1 (2020), https://www.dol.gov/sites/
dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/ebsa-monetary-results.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MDN9-DN3Y].
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 2612.
104. Id. § 2601(b).
105. See id. § 2612(c).
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maintain any healthcare coverage or other employment benefits the
employee has while the employee is on leave.106
The business community staunchly opposed the FMLA, which was
evident during the legislation’s debate and ultimate passage.107 The
FMLA was eight years in the making, spanning three presidential
administrations, and suffering two presidential vetoes before ultimately
being signed into law. The business community’s opposition helped to
severely dilute the legislation from its original form. The original bill,
introduced as the Parental and Disability Leave Act of 1985,108 offered
eighteen weeks of unpaid leave. Over the next eight years, various
iterations of the legislation added more exemptions for small businesses
and heightened eligibility requirements to qualify for the leave.109
106. Id. § 2614.
107. Michael Selmi, Is Something Better than Nothing? Critical Reflections on Ten Years of the
FMLA, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 65, 69 (2004).
108. H.R. 2020, 99th Cong. (1985).
109. The Parental and Disability Leave Act of 1985 stated at section 106(a):
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or in any other
manner discriminate against an individual for (1) exercising any right to which such individual
is entitled under the provisions of this title, (2) the purpose of interferring [sic] with the
attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under this title, or
(3) opposing any practice made unlawful by this title.
Id. § 106(a). Section 106(b) of the bill read:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or in any other
manner discriminate against any individual because such individual has filed any complaint or
has instituted or caused to be instituted, or is about to institute or cause to be instituted, any
proceeding under or related to this title, or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or
proceeding or has given or is about to give any information connected to any inquiry or
proceeding relating to this title.
Id. § 106(b).
The next iteration of the legislation was the Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986. S. 2278, 99th
Cong. (1985); H.R. 4300, 99th Cong. (1985). Similar versions of this legislation were introduced in
the House and the Senate, and both versions contained identical interference language. See S. 2278,
99th Cong. (1985); H.R. 4300, 99th Cong. (1985). In early 1987, the Parental and Temporary Medical
Leave Act of 1987 and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1987 were introduced in the Senate and
House, respectively. S. 249, 100th Cong. (1987); H.R. 925, 100th Cong. (1987). These bills contained
the same broad interference language that the 1986 versions did. S. 249, 100th Cong. (1987);
H.R. 925, 100th Cong. (1987). While no action was taken on the Senate bill, hearings were held in
the House, and the bill was reported favorably out of Committee. H.R. REP. NO. 100-511, pt. 2 (1988).
However, no further action was taken. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1987, H.R. 925, 100th Cong.
(1987). A new version of the bill, the Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1988, was introduced in the
Senate in June 1988. S. 2488, 100th Cong. (1988). This version again included the identical
interference language found in the 1986 and 1987 versions. Id. The bill was filibustered in the Senate
and was eventually withdrawn. James S. Ray & Barbara Berish Brown, Federal Legislation Update:
January–October 1988, 5 LAB. LAW. 135, 145 (1989). The interference text remained unchanged in
the versions of the bills introduced in the House and Senate in February 1989, and although the
legislation was passed by Congress, it was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush. See 136 CONG.
REC. 16,681 (1990). In January 1991, bills were introduced in the House and the Senate yet again.
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1991, H.R. 2, 102d Cong. (1991); Family and Medical Leave Act
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The FMLA has been amended four times since its passage. These
amendments provided coverage to certain legislative branch
employees,110 created an entitlement for military family leave,111
expanded the military family leave provisions,112 and added hours of
service eligibility requirements for airline flight crews.113
Family leave is a salient topic, and the role of the FMLA cannot be
overstated. While there is no federal statute that requires paid family
leave, many states have started passing laws that provide more protections
for more people than the FMLA. For instance, California passed a law
requiring that as of January 1, 2018, employees taking family leave be

of 1991, S. 5, 102d Cong. (1991). They too contained the interference language, unchanged since the
1986 version of the legislation. H.R. 2; S. 5. The measure was passed, but President Bush again vetoed
the bill. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Is the Work-Family Conflict Pathological or Normal Under the
FMLA? The Potential of the FMLA to Cover Ordinary Work-Family Conflicts, 15 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 193, 200 n.23 (2004). An attempt to override the veto was made, and while two-thirds of the
senators voted to override it, there were not enough votes in the House. 138 CONG. REC. 27,493–513
(1992). Sixty-eight voted to override the veto, and thirty-one voted not to; one senator did not vote.
138 CONG. REC. 27,513 (1992). Two hundred fifty-eight members of the House voted to override the
veto, and 169 members voted not to; five members did not vote. 138 CONG. REC. 29,140 (1992). In
January 1993, another version of the measure was introduced in the House. Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993, H.R. 1, 103d Cong. (1993). Substantial changes were made to the bill after its
introduction, but none of them related to the text of the interference provision; it remained unchanged
from the 1986 version. See Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986, H.R. 4300, 99th Cong. (as
introduced in the House, Mar. 4, 1986); Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986, S. 2278, 99th Cong.
(1986). Section 107(a)(1) of the 1986 House bill stated, “It shall be unlawful for any employer to
interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under
this title.” H.R. 4300 § 107(a)(1). Section 107(a)(2) stated, “It shall be unlawful for any employer to
discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made
unlawful by this title.” Id. § 107(a)(2).
110. Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1438). This amendment added FMLA coverage to the Government
Accountability Office and Library of Congress. It also provided that FMLA applies to certain
congressional employees.
111. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3
(2008). This Act created two categories of military leave: military exigency leave and military
caregiver leave. Id. The first category is for private sector employees with a close family member in
the National Guard or Reserves. Id. The other is for leave to provide care for a covered service member
with an illness or injury. Id.
112. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190
(2009). This Act expanded military exigency leave to extend leave to private sector employees with
a close family member who is in the regular Armed Forces (in addition to Reserve members) and
provided leave for U.S. Government civilian employees with a close family member in the Armed
Forces, National Guard, or Reserves. Id. This Act also expanded caregiver leave to provide leave for
family members of certain veterans with illness or injury and allowed the use of leave to care for a
service member who had an illness or injury obtained before service but was aggravated during
service. Id.
113. Airline Flight Crew Technical Corrections Act, Pub. L. No. 111-119, 123 Stat. 3476 (2009).
This amendment added an hour-of-service eligibility criterion for coverage of certain airline flight
crew employees. Id.
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paid 70% of their wages if they qualify as a lowest-paid earner.114 For
almost all other workers, the rate will be 60%, up to a maximum weekly
benefit of about $1,300.115 Other states that have family leave laws that
go beyond the protections of the FMLA include New York,116 New
Jersey,117 and Rhode Island.118
The FMLA is a vital labor protection tool that allows individuals to
care for their families and themselves without having to forego
employment to do so. This is especially true with over 43.5 million
Americans serving as caregivers119 and an increasing number of U.S.
citizens becoming members of the “sandwich generation,” meaning they
are caring for their children and their aging parents.120 With the creation
of new employee rights came added statutory protection of those rights in
the form of a retaliation prohibition. The FMLA retaliation provision
prohibits the interference with the exercise of rights provided under the
Act.121 It also prohibits retaliation against a person because said person
had participated in proceedings or inquiries under the Act.122 Retaliation
against individuals who have requested and/or taken FMLA leave has
taken many forms, including demotion, lack of promotion, punitive
workloads, creation and maintenance of hostile work environments,
employee discipline, negative performance appraisals, location transfers,
and termination.123
Its passage was viewed as a step in the right direction. However, over
114. Jennifer Bennett Shinall, The Pregnancy Penalty, 103 MINN. L. REV. 749, 811 (2018).
115. Calculating Paid Family Leave Benefit Payment Amounts, STATE OF CAL., EMP. DEV. DEP’T,
https://edd.ca.gov/Disability/Calculating_PFL_Benefit_Payment_Amounts.htm
[https://perma.cc/2FMG-SPMT].
116. N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW §§ 200–242 (Consol. 2020).
117. New Jersey Family Medical Leave Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11B-1 (West 2020).
118. 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-41-35(h) (2020).
119. AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. & THE NAT’L ALL. FOR CAREGIVING, CAREGIVING IN THE U.S. 15
(2015), https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/2015/caregiving-in-the-united-states-2015report-revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/5V7T-93SQ].
120. PEW RSCH. CTR., THE SANDWICH GENERATION: RISING FINANCIAL BURDENS FOR MIDDLEAGED AMERICANS 1 (2013), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/01/
Sandwich_Generation_Report_FINAL_1-29.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9R5-8MXA].
121. 29 U.S.C. § 2615.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Blohm v. Dillard’s Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477 (E.D.N.C. 2000) (analyzing
situation in which operations manager at a department store was demoted after he took FMLA leave
for the birth of his child during the store’s inventory of merchandise); Switzer v. Rivera, 174 F. Supp.
2d 1097, 1106 (D. Nev. 2001) (alleging acts by supervisor prevented plaintiff from signing bid sheet
to qualify for more senior position); Anusie-Howard v. Todd, 983 F. Supp. 2d 645, 646 (D. Md. 2013)
(alleging FMLA retaliation when employer assigned a part-time employee full-time work after an
FMLA leave request); Hite v. Biomet, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 720, 726 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (alleging a
hostile environment when returning to work after taking FMLA leave).
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twenty-five years later, the initial step remains the only permanent step
that has been taken.124 The United States lags behind other industrialized
nations with respect to family policy legislation.125 For example, of the
185 countries and territories, the United States joins Papua New Guinea
and Suriname as one of only three countries that does not have federal
legislation providing monetary benefits to women during maternity
leave.126 Additionally, a survey of fifteen developed countries showed that
the median duration of protected leave for mothers is sixty weeks, five
times that of what the FMLA offers.127
Despite the FMLA’s weaknesses compared to leave entitlements in
other countries, it still remains the only federal legislation of its kind in
the United States. It covers about half of the labor force, and the law has
been instrumental in providing leave for employees. Although the FMLA
protects both men and women, as well as people of all races, caregiving
responsibilities disproportionately fall on women.128 Effects of caregiving
are even more pronounced on women of color.129 Women of color with
caregiving responsibilities are often treated less favorably than white
women with caregiving responsibilities.130 While women are
disproportionately affected by FMLA responsibilities, men also face
workplace discrimination with respect to caregiving responsibilities.131
E.

Protections for Servicemembers

A year after passage of the FMLA, Congress passed USERRA.
USERRA was created to strengthen its predecessor statutes—the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, the Selective Service Act of
1948, the Universal Military Training and Service Act, and the Vietnam

124. In March 2020, Congress passed the Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act as part of the Families
First Coronavirus Response Act granting paid sick leave to certain covered employees. The Act states
that the paid sick leave entitlement expires December 31, 2020. Families First Coronavirus Response
Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020).
125. Catherine Albiston, Institutional Perspectives on Law, Work, and Family, 3 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 397, 401 (2007).
126. Christina Neckermann, An International Embarrassment: The United States as an Anomaly
in Maternity Leave Policy in the Industrialized World, 38 HARV. INT’L REV. 40, 41 (2017).
127. Id. at 42.
128. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL
DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES 3 (2007) [hereinafter
EEOC], http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.pdf [https://perma.cc/79AV-YFUH].
129. Id.
130. Id. at 3–4; Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s
Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
371, 381–82 (2001).
131. EEOC, supra note 128, at 6–7.
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Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 (VEVRAA).132
Interestingly, a U.S. Supreme Court opinion concerning causation
standards partially fueled the creation of USERRA. In Monroe v.
Standard Oil Co.,133 a refinery employee who was a military reservist filed
a VEVRAA claim against his employer because the employer failed to
take steps to permit him to make up work hours from weekends when the
employee had military training.134 The Court held that VEVRAA
protected the “employee-reservist against discriminations like discharge
and demotion, motivated solely by reserve status.”135 The legislative
history of USERRA makes it clear that Congress intended the use of
membership in, application for membership in, or obligation to the armed
forces as a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision as a
violation of the statute.136 As a result, unlike the other statutes discussed
in this Article, USERRA actually establishes motivating factor as the
causation standard in the text of the statute. Because the statute explicitly
mentions the causation standard, there is no danger of the Court applying
the heightened but-for causation standard to USERRA. However, this
Article will discuss the statute nonetheless to illustrate some parallels
between USERRA and other minimum labor standards statutes.137
USERRA guarantees veterans reemployment after military service,138
prescribes the position to which they are entitled to return,139 prohibits
employers from discriminating against returning veterans because of their
military service,140 and prohibits employers from firing veterans without
cause within a year of reemployment.141 Since its passage in 1994,
USERRA has been amended to expressly declare that there is no federal
or state statute of limitations for claims under the statute,142 alter the
definition of “benefit[s] of employment” to include wages and salary,143
and include coverage for members of the National Guard responding to
emergencies within the United States.144
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See 38 U.S.C. § 4212.
452 U.S. 549 (1981).
Id. at 549.
Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
See H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, pt. 1, at 24 (1994).
See infra section IV.B.
38 U.S.C. § 4312.
Id. § 4313.
Id. § 4311.
Id. § 4316(c)(1).
Id. § 4327(b).
Id. § 4303(2).
Id. § 4303.
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THE APPLICATION OF GROSS AND NASSAR TO MINIMUM
LABOR STANDARDS LEGISLATION

Federal minimum labor standards statutes are crucial to labor
protections, and broad retaliation provisions are essential to effective
enforcement. While Gross and Nassar decided the retaliation causation
standard for two prominent employment discrimination statutes, it
remains an open question for retaliation claims brought under minimum
labor standards statutes. Applying Gross and Nassar to these laws
undermines their purpose and yields grossly inconsistent results. This Part
discusses the current legal landscape of causation standards in the labor
standards legislation and details the resulting standards if Gross and
Nassar are applied. It also provides examples of how similar situations
would require differing causation standards using the Gross and Nassar
rationales.
A.

What the Courts Are Doing Currently

Federal courts have already started applying Gross and Nassar to
federal minimum labor standards retaliation cases.145 A but-for causation
standard is the predominant standard used in FLSA retaliation cases.
Conversely, motivating factor is the prevalent causation standard courts
use for retaliation claims under OSHA, ERISA, and FMLA. However, the
Supreme Court has not reached the question of what causation standard is
required for any of these statutes, and the courts of appeal vary greatly in
their approaches.
Some courts were already applying but-for causation to FLSA
retaliation claims prior to the Gross and Nassar decisions.146 Other courts

145. See, e.g., Kubiak v. S.W. Cowboy, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1365 (M.D. Fla. 2016)
(applying the but-for causation requirement from Nassar to an FLSA retaliation claim); West v. City
of Holly Springs, No. 3:16CV79-MPM-RP, 2019 WL 2267294, at *2 (N.D. Miss. May 28, 2019)
(applying Nassar to an FLSA retaliation case); Jackson v. Haynes & Haynes, P.C.,
No. 2:16-CV-01297-AKK, 2017 WL 3173302, at *5 (N.D. Ala. July 26, 2017) (citing Nassar when
holding that the plaintiff’s FLSA retaliation claim fails because she cannot show the employer’s
retaliation was the but-for cause of her discharge); Sharp v. Profitt, 674 F. App’x 440, 451 (6th Cir.
2016) (applying Nassar to the FMLA); Gourdeau v. City of Newton, 238 F. Supp. 3d 179, 187 (D.
Mass. 2017) (holding that Nassar’s logic signals a but-for causation requirement in the FMLA);
Acosta v. Brain, 910 F.3d 502, 513–14 (9th Cir. 2018) (assuming, but not deciding, that the but-for
causation standard from Gross and Nassar that the lower court used is applicable to an ERISA
retaliation claim). But see Perez v. Lloyd Indus., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 3d 308, 314 (E.D. Pa. 2019)
(affording deference to the U.S. Department of Labor’s interpretation of the retaliation causation
standard under OSHA as either substantial reason or but-for despite the Gross and Nassar decisions).
146. See, e.g., Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 580–81 (5th Cir. 2004) (requiring
but-for causation for an FLSA retaliation claim); Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th
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have only started this application in the wake of the decisions. Currently,
the Fifth147 and Eleventh148 circuits use a but-for standard. Additionally,
the Tenth Circuit utilizes a but-for test, yet refers to it as a motivating
factor standard.149 In 1984, the Tenth Circuit held that “[w]hen the
‘immediate cause or motivating factor of a discharge is the employee’s
assertion of statutory rights, the discharge is discriminatory under [the
FLSA] whether or not other grounds for discharge exist.’”150 However,
despite this language, the Tenth Circuit has clarified that it views the
motivating factor and but-for tests as equivalent, holding in a later case
that “the discharge is unlawful only if it would not have occurred but for
the retaliatory intent.”151
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ standard likewise lacks clarity. In
1996, the Ninth Circuit expressed a “dual motive test” in a FLSA
retaliation claim.152 It explained that under this test, a plaintiff must prove
their protected activities were a “substantial factor” in bringing about the
adverse employment action, and protected activities do not constitute a
“substantial factor” where the adverse actions would not have been taken
but for the protected activities.153 In a 2014 Ninth Circuit FLSA retaliation
case, the court noted that it would not decide whether Nassar applies to
FLSA retaliation, but referenced one of its cases from 1999 rejecting the
argument that the scope of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision prescribes
the construction courts should give the FLSA’s provision.154 The
dissenting opinion, written by a senior district court judge sitting by
designation, asserted that a motivating factor standard should be used

Cir. 2000) (noting that when showing causation, “the plaintiff must prove that the adverse action
would not have been taken ‘but for’ the assertion of FLSA rights”); Clark v. Shop24 Glob., LLC, 77
F. Supp. 3d 660, 684 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (requiring an FLSA retaliation plaintiff to produce evidence
that the adverse action would not have occurred but for his engagement in protected activity).
147. Espinoza v. San Benito Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 753 F. App’x 216, 222 (5th Cir. 2018)
(requiring the plaintiff to prove that the adverse employment action would not have happened but for
the protected activity).
148. Andreu v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 683 F. App’x 894, 895 (11th Cir. 2017) (requiring FLSA
retaliation plaintiffs prove that the adverse action would not have occurred “but for” the
protected activity).
149. See Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1984).
150. Id. at 387 (quoting Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975)).
151. Martin v. Gingerbread House, Inc., 977 F.2d 1405, 1408 n.4 (10th Cir. 1992) (emphasis in
original); see also Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1394 (10th Cir. 1997).
152. Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton, 81 F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 1996).
153. Id.
154. Avila v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 758 F.3d 1096, 1101 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Lambert v.
Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1005 (9th Cir. 1999)). But see McBurnie v. City of Prescott, 511 F. App’x
624, 624 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Gross when holding that the district court did not err in giving the
jury a “but-for” causation instruction on McBurnie’s FLSA retaliation claim).
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because of past circuit precedent.155
In circuits that have not decided the issue, many district courts are
applying Gross and/or Nassar to FLSA retaliation claims.156 However,
there are some district courts that are applying the motivating factor
standard.157
With respect to standard of causation in OSHA retaliation claims, fewer
courts have decided the issue. This is likely because OSHA does not
provide for a private right of action. However, motivating factor appears
to be the prevailing standard in district courts.158 DOL has promulgated
regulations that address OSHA’s retaliation provision. The applicable
regulation reads, in relevant part, as follows:
[T]o establish a violation of section 11(c), the employee’s
engagement in protected activity need not be the sole
consideration behind discharge or other adverse action. If
protected activity was a substantial reason for the action, or if the
discharge or other adverse action would not have taken place “but
for” engagement in protected activity, section 11(c) has

155. Avila, 758 F.3d at 1107 n.3 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
156. See Demers v. Cnty. of Barron, No. 18-CV-030-WMC, 2019 WL 2287980, at *11 (W.D. Wis.
May 29, 2019) (noting that “[w]hile the Seventh Circuit has not addressed the specific standard
applicable in FLSA retaliation claims, given the similarity of language between the retaliation
provisions of the FLSA and Title VII, the court agrees with defendant that the ‘but for’ or ‘because
of’ standard, rather than the motivating factor standard, governs plaintiff’s [FLSA retaliation] claim”);
Palencar v. N.Y. Power Auth., No. 5:15-CV-1363, 2019 WL 4918426, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2019)
(applying Nassar to the plaintiff’s Title VII and FLSA retaliation claims); Poff v. Quick Pick, LLC,
No. 2:15-CV-00405-JMS-MJD, 2018 WL 6061569, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 20, 2018) (applying but-for
causation standard to FLSA retaliation claim); Sanchez v. Caregivers Staffing Servs., Inc.,
No. 1:15-CV-01579, 2017 WL 380912, at *3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 26, 2017) (citing Nassar when holding
that but-for causation applies to FLSA retaliation claims); Aponte v. Mod. Furniture Mfg. Co.,
14-CV-4813ADSAKT, 2016 WL 5372799, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2016) (citing Nassar and
applying but-for causation while noting that although the Second Circuit has not explicitly applied a
but-for causation standard to FLSA claims, other lower courts have done so); Kubiak v. S.W.
Cowboy, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1365 n.30 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (asserting that there is no meaningful
basis on which to distinguish the language in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision and the language
in the FLSA’s provision, and holding that but-for causation applies in FLSA retaliation cases); Mould
v. NJG Food Serv. Inc., 37 F. Supp. 3d 762, 778 n.11 (D. Md. 2014) (interpreting FLSA retaliation
claims as requiring proof that the plaintiff’s protected activity was the but-for cause of the adverse
employment action).
157. See, e.g., Winful v. Med. Univ. of S.C., No. 2:13-CV-02150-DCN, 2015 WL 5691558, at *6
(D.S.C. Sept. 28, 2015) (allowing the plaintiff to use a mixed motive framework to show an
impermissible factor motivated the employer’s adverse employment decision).
158. See, e.g., Brown v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t Dep’t of Pub. Works,
No. 08-500-JMH, 2010 WL 1529410, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 15, 2010) (holding that the plaintiff had
not demonstrated that a genuine issue existed as to whether the OSHA grievance she filed was “a
substantial or motivating factor” in her termination); Chao v. Norse Dairy Sys., No. C-2-05-0826,
2007 WL 2838958, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2007) (applying a motivating factor standard in a case
brought by the U.S. Secretary of Labor alleging OSHA violations).
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been violated.159
According to the regulation, individuals claiming retaliation under OSHA
have the option of showing the protected activity was a substantial reason
or the but-for cause of the adverse action. However, the DOL,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration has started applying
Nassar to its OSHA investigations. Citing the Court’s ruling in Nassar,
the agency has decided that it must have reasonable cause to believe that
the adverse action would not have occurred but for the protected
activity.160 This change is reflected in the agency’s OSHA Whistleblowers
Investigation Manual that went into effect in January 2016.161 The prior
manual that was effective September 2011, after Gross but before Nassar,
stated that motivating factor was the causation standard to be used in
OSHA retaliation cases.162 The agency notes that the but-for causation
standard is more stringent than the motivating factor, or the even lower,
contributing factor tests that it uses for other retaliation and
whistleblower statutes.163
Motivating factor is the prevailing standard for ERISA retaliation
claims, and for most courts this standard pre-dated Gross and Nassar. The

159. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.6(b) (2019).
160. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., WHISTLEBLOWER
INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL 3-6 (2016) [hereinafter DOL 2016], https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/
Directive_pdf/CPL_02-03-007.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6HX-CWAV].
161. Id.
162. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., WHISTLEBLOWER
INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL 3-6 (2011) [hereinafter DOL 2011], https://www.osha.gov/sites/
default/files/enforcement/directives/CPL_02-03-003.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQ3S-B4QC].
163. The U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration has
enforcement authority over twenty-two retaliation/whistleblower statutes. They are categorized as
district court statutes, administrative statutes, and environmental statutes. OSHA is one of three
district court statutes, all of which have “because” language similar to the Title VII retaliation
provision. The causation standard for the thirteen administrative statutes is contributing factor, while
the standard for the six environmental statutes is motivating factor. See DOL 2011, supra note 162,
at 3-6 to 3-7.
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Second,164 Sixth,165 Eleventh,166 and District of Columbia167 Circuits use
a motivating factor standard for ERISA retaliation. While it has not
explicitly decided the issue post-Gross and Nassar, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals has stated that the ERISA retaliation provision “does not
explicitly permit [mixed motive] claims, so on the strength of [Seventh
Circuit] caselaw, but-for causation is probably required.”168 Additionally,
the Ninth Circuit has been applying motivating factor as the causation
standard in ERISA retaliation claims for decades.169 However, the court
recently signaled that Gross and Nassar may change this. In Acosta v.
Brain,170 the Ninth Circuit decided a case in which the district court
applied a but-for causation standard to an ERISA claim. The court
explained the Gross and Nassar decisions, and assumed, without
deciding, that but-for causation applied.171 The court noted that the more
stringent but-for standard did not affect the issues on appeal.172 ERISA
has an amendment issue that is similar to the one cited concerning the
ADEA in Gross. The Gross Court compared the actions of Congress with
respect to Title VII and the ADEA. Because both employment
discrimination statutes were amended around the same time, the Court
reasoned that because Congress only added a motivating factor standard
to Title VII, not the ADEA, Congress was intentional about not wanting
to add motivating factor language to the ADEA.173 This reinforced the
Court’s interpretation of the ADEA as requiring but-for causation. An
analogous situation exists with respect to ERISA and the ACA. In 2010,
164. See, e.g., Dister v. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a vital
element the plaintiff must prove under ERISA is that the employer was at least in part motivated by
the specific intent to engage in activity prohibited by the statute).
165. See, e.g., Stein v. Atlas Indus., Inc., 730 F. App’x 313, 321–22 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that
the employee need not prove that interference or retaliation with ERISA entitlements was the
employer’s sole purpose but rather, the employee needed to show that a reasonable jury could find
that unlawful considerations were a motivating factor in its actions); Humphreys v. Bellaire Corp.,
966 F.2d 1037, 1043 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding an ERISA retaliation is not required to prove that the
employer’s sole purpose in terminating his employment was to interfere with his retirement benefits,
but rather that it was a motivating factor in the decision).
166. See, e.g., Echols v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 385 F. App’x 959, 961–62 (11th Cir. 2010)
(requiring the plaintiff to show that interference with her rights under ERISA was a motivating factor
in her discharge).
167. See, e.g., Giles v. Transit Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 794 F.3d 1, 6, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(applying a motivating factor standard to an ERISA retaliation claim).
168. Nauman v. Abbott Lab’ys, 669 F.3d 854, 857–58 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2012).
169. See, e.g., Dytrt v. Mountain State Tel. & Tel. Co., 921 F.2d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying
a motivating factor causation standard).
170. 910 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2018).
171. Id. at 513–14.
172. Id. at 514 n.3.
173. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009).
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Congress amended ERISA through the passage of the ACA, and while it
amended ERISA in several ways it did not explicitly state the causation
standard. Courts may use this as evidence that Congress did not intend
ERISA to have a motivating factor standard.174 However, since motivating
factor was the prevailing standard in ERISA retaliation claims and Nassar
had not yet been decided, Congress had no reason to consider such
an amendment.
The FMLA cases decide, or at least mention, the causation issue the
most out of the minimum labor standards statutes examined in this Article.
There is currently a circuit split with respect to the causation standard
required in FMLA retaliation cases. A review of the evolution of the
circuit split necessitates an examination of the FMLA retaliation causation
legal landscape prior to the Court’s 2009 decision in Gross.175 Before
Gross, courts construed causation in employment discrimination statutes
broadly and used a motivating factor standard.176 In Gross, the plaintiff
filed suit against his employer for demoting him, asserting that the
demotion was because of his age, and thus in violation of the ADEA.177
The Court held that but-for causation was required under the ADEA, and
that there could be no ADEA mixed motive claims.178
After Gross, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had the opportunity to
address the issue of whether Gross’s heightened causation standard for
ADEA retaliation claims affected the causation standard for FMLA
retaliation. In Hunter v. Valley View Local Schools,179 the court addressed
the issue of whether but-for causation was required for FMLA retaliation
claims in the wake of Gross. The Sixth Circuit decided to revisit the
appropriateness of applying Title VII precedent to the FMLA after noting
the Supreme Court drew a dichotomy between the ADEA and Title VII
with respect to application of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins180 mixed
motive framework.181 The Sixth Circuit concluded that Price Waterhouse
was still applicable to the FMLA; thus, a mixed motive framework, rather
than but-for causation, was in order.182 The court held that if the plaintiff

174. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
175. Gross, 557 U.S. at 167.
176. See, e.g., Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that
the causation required for Title VII retaliation is construed broadly, and the employee merely has to
show that the adverse action and protected activity are not completely unrelated).
177. Gross, 557 U.S. at 169.
178. Id. at 177.
179. 579 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2009).
180. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
181. Hunter, 579 F.3d at 691.
182. Id. at 692.
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established that her employer discriminated against her, the burden then
shifted to the employer to show that it would have taken the same action
despite the impermissible motive.183
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals—post-Gross, but pre-Nassar—
considered an FMLA retaliation claim in which a dispatcher who had been
terminated from her job alleged retaliation under the FMLA in Wisbey v.
City of Lincoln.184 The court noted that the plaintiff was not required to
prove but-for causation; rather, she need only prove that a retaliatory
motive played a role in the adverse employment action.185 Other circuits
had the opportunity to determine the effect Gross had on FMLA
retaliation claims, but opted not to render a definitive decision.186
Of the circuits that have had the issue of the FMLA retaliation
causation standard post-Nassar, the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit to
mandate a but-for requirement as the causation standard. Two of the other
circuits have applied a motivating factor standard,187 and three other
circuits have had an opportunity to announce a standard multiple times,
but declined to do so.188
In Sharp v. Profitt,189 the Sixth Circuit ruled on an FMLA retaliation
case involving a Waste Management employee who had been terminated
after taking FMLA leave. The court held that but-for causation was the
FMLA retaliation causation standard.190 The court noted, referencing
Nassar, that it had frequently looked to Title VII precedent with respect
to the FMLA.191 The court also drew analogies to the terms “because” and
“for” as part of its rationale.192 Specifically, the court noted that the
“because” language was used by the Supreme Court in ascribing the butfor causation standard to Title VII.193 Although the Sharp opinion states,
183. Id.
184. 612 F.3d 667, 676 (8th Cir. 2010).
185. Id.
186. See Breeden v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 646 F.3d 43, 56 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Because we
affirm the district court on [the employee’s] appeal, we do not reach [the employer’s] conditional
cross-appeal regarding the viability of a mixed motive claim under the FMLA.”); Lichtenstein v.
Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Although [the employee] calls on
us to apply the mixed-motive framework to her retaliation claim, she readily survives summary
judgment under the more taxing McDonnell Douglas standard. Accordingly, we proceed under
McDonnell Douglas and leave for another day our resolution of whether the FMLA continues to allow
mixed-motive claims in the wake of Gross.”).
187. See infra notes 196–201 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 205–207 and accompanying text.
189. 674 F. App’x 440 (6th Cir. 2016).
190. Id. at 451.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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“given our interpretive practices and the meaning ‘for’ has in the statute’s
context, it seems that FMLA retaliation requires a showing of but-for
causation,” it states a paragraph later, “we do not need to decide today
whether but-for causation applies to the FMLA.”194 Despite the imprecise
nature of the opinion, district courts in the Sixth Circuit have cited Sharp
as precedent for the proposition that FMLA claims require a showing of
but-for causation.195
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered the same issue in Egan
v. Delaware River Port Authority.196 Here, the court concluded that under
the FMLA implementing regulation promulgated by the DOL, employers
are prohibited from using an employee’s FMLA leave as a negative factor
in employment decisions. The regulation also states “an employee does
not need to prove that invoking FMLA rights was the sole or most
important factor upon which the employer acted.”197 In other words, the
DOL regulation allows a motivating factor standard, and the Third Circuit
gave deference to the regulation. Hence, the court held that the motivating
factor standard should be used in FMLA retaliation cases.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also examined the FMLA
retaliation causation standard issue in Woods v. START Treatment &
Recovery Centers, Inc.198 Here, an employee was terminated from her job
as a substance abuse counselor at an addiction treatment facility after
taking FMLA leave.199 She alleged the termination was in retaliation for
taking the leave, and appealed the lower court’s decision to give a jury
instruction requiring but-for causation.200 Similarly to the Third Circuit,
the Second Circuit in Woods gave the DOL’s FMLA implementing
regulation201 Chevron deference.202 Thus, the court held that a motivating
factor standard was appropriate.203

194. Id.
195. See Shimko v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., LLC, No. 4:17-CV-11709, 2019 WL 934857, at *8 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 26, 2019) (describing the holding in Sharp as “explaining that establishing a prima facie
case of FMLA retaliation requires ‘a showing of but-for causation’”); Brown v. Duke Energy Corp.,
No. 1:13CV869, 2019 WL 1439402, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2019) (“[I]t seems that FMLA
retaliation requires a showing of but-for causation.” (quoting Sharp, 674 F. App’x at 451)); Harris v.
City of Lewisburg, No. 1:15-CV-00114, 2017 WL 3237780, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. July 31, 2017) (noting
Sharp’s proposition that FMLA retaliation claims require the plaintiff to prove but-for causation).
196. 851 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2017).
197. Id. at 272.
198. 864 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2017).
199. Id. at 162.
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2016)).
202. Woods, 864 F.3d at 168.
203. Id. at 166.
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Other circuits have chosen not to decide the issue, despite the
opportunity to do so. The Fifth Circuit was confronted with the issue
several times, but expressly decided not to address it in each instance.204
Likewise, the First,205 Seventh,206 and Eleventh207 Circuits has postponed
determination on the issue. In sum, while only one circuit applies the
heightened but-for causation standard to FMLA retaliation claims, many
lower courts have done so, and it remains possible that the Supreme Court
will adopt that standard for such claims.
B.

Distinguishing the Statutes

While the text of retaliation provisions in workplace statutes varies
greatly,208 each provision typically has at least one of the following: an
opposition clause, a participation clause, and an interference clause.209
Opposition clauses make it unlawful for an employer or potential
employer to take an adverse employment action against an employee or
applicant for employment because the individual has opposed a practice
made unlawful by a statute. Participation clauses generally protect
employees or applicants who have participated in any proceeding
regarding the exercise of a right guaranteed by the statute. This typically
204. See Wheat v. Fla. Par. Juv. Just. Comm’n, 811 F.3d 702, 706 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Neither this
Court, nor the Supreme Court, has decided whether the heightened ‘but for’ causation standard
required for Title VII retaliation claims applies with equal force to FMLA retaliation claims.”); Ion
v. Chevron USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 379, 390 (5th Cir. 2013) (“We emphasize that we need not, and do
not, decide whether Nassar’s analytical approach applies to FMLA-retaliation claims and, if so,
whether it requires a plaintiff to prove but-for causation.”); Harrelson v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 614 F.
App’x 761, 763 n.3 (5th Cir. 2015) (“We have yet to decide whether Nassar applies to the FMLA
context.”); Castay v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 604 F. App’x 355, 356 n.2 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Because we
concluded that the plaintiff’s claim in that case would fail under either [Title VII or FMLA] standard,
we did not decide whether the ‘but for’ causation standard should apply in FMLA retaliation cases.”).
205. Chase v. USPS, 843 F.3d 553, 559–60 n.2 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[W]e save for another day the
question of Nassar’s impact on FMLA jurisprudence with respect to the required causation
standard . . . .”).
206. See Malin v. Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 562 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Our circuit has not
addressed, and the parties have not briefed, whether but-for causation should apply to FMLA claims
in light of Gross and Nassar.”).
207. Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 707 F. App’x 641, 646 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting that the court would
not decide whether the district court erred in applying a “but-for” causation standard to the plaintiff’s
FMLA retaliation claim because the plaintiff had not proved she suffered an adverse employment
action).
208. Professor Alex B. Long bemoans the inconsistencies in the statutory text and has called for a
single retaliation provision that would apply to all federal workplace statutes. See Alex B. Long,
Employment Retaliation and the Accident of Text, 90 OR. L. REV. 525, 561–63 (2011).
209. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 274 (2009) (labeling anti-retaliation clauses in
Title VII as an “opposition clause” and “participation clause”); Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 514–15 (1997) (referring to the provision
preventing interference with rights under ERISA as the “interference clause”).
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includes filing a complaint, causing a complaint to be filed, or testifying
in a proceeding. Some participation clauses also cover anticipatory
participation, meaning those provisions encompass individuals who are
about to testify in a proceeding, but have not yet done so. Interference
clauses prohibit employers from interfering with the rights conferred by
the statute. Because of the textual inconsistences between the minimum
labor standards statutes, an analysis of the text of each is important.
The FLSA retaliation provision reads, in relevant part, as follows:
[T]o discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any
employee because such employee has filed any complaint or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or
related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any
such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an
industry committee.210
The FLSA retaliation provision is only comprised of a participation
clause, and it uses the term “because.” If Gross or Nassar are applied,
FLSA retaliation plaintiffs would be required to prove but-for causation
under the FLSA. Application of Gross seems especially plausible,
because Gross was an ADEA case, albeit not a retaliation case, and the
ADEA was passed as an amendment to the FLSA.
Unlike FLSA, which only has a participation clause, OSHA has both a
participation and an opposition clause.211 OSHA’s retaliation provision
reads as follows:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against
any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or
related to this chapter or has testified or is about to testify in any
such proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on
behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by
this [statute].212
While the DOL has promulgated implementing regulations pertaining to
the OSHA retaliation provision, these regulations neither address the
causation standard nor contain any alternative language that may lead a
court to give deference to a lower standard. However, the DOL itself
appears to be applying Nassar, but not Gross, to OSHA retaliation
cases.213 One reason DOL may not be applying Gross is because Gross
210. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Industry committees, composed of members that the U.S. Department
of Labor appointed, recommended rates of minimum pay in various industries. Section 205 of the
FLSA provided the statutory authority for the DOL for such committees. Id. § 205.
211. Id. § 660(c)(1).
212. Id.
213. See DOL 2016, supra note 160.
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was not a retaliation case. Application of Nassar would require that
OSHA retaliation plaintiffs prove but-for causation.
Unlike the FLSA and OSHA retaliation provisions, neither Gross nor
Nassar can apply in ERISA context based on the statute’s retaliation
language. The ERISA retaliation provision reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend,
expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or
beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under
the provisions of an employee benefit plan, this subchapter,
section 1201 of this title, or the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act, or for the purpose of interfering with the
attainment of any right to which such participant may become
entitled under the plan, this subchapter, or the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act. It shall be unlawful for any person
to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against any
person because he has given information or has testified or is
about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this
chapter or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. In the
case of a multiemployer plan, it shall be unlawful for the plan
sponsor or any other person to discriminate against any
contributing employer for exercising rights under this chapter or
for giving information or testifying in any inquiry or proceeding
relating to this chapter before Congress.214
This provision contains two interference clauses and two participation
clauses, one of each for individuals and contributing employers. Notably,
only one of the four clauses contains the term “because.” As a result,
application of Gross and Nassar to ERISA would mean that a contributing
employer would be able to use a motivating factor standard regardless of
the provision under which it filed its claim. However, individual
employees would only be able to use a motivating factor standard if they
filed under the interference provision. If the employee filed under the
participation clause, the employee would have to prove the heightened
but-for standard of causation.
An illustration is helpful here. Suppose Employees X and Y work for
the same organization. X files an ERISA complaint with the DOL alleging
the employer terminates employees for the purposes of evading its
obligations under a long-term disability plan. As part of its investigation,
DOL calls Y to testify. After learning of this, the employer fires both X
and Y. X files a retaliation claim under the interference provision of the
statute, and Y files a retaliation claim under the participation clause. X, the
employee who filed the original complaint, can proceed under a
214. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (citations omitted).

Steele (Do Not Delete)

1922

12/14/2020 11:09 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1891

motivating factor standard. However, Y, the employee who testified when
called on to do so by the federal government, would have the heightened
burden of proving but-for causation. The Supreme Court has previously
referred to this type of situation in which the complaint initiator has more
protections than a witness as “freakish.”215 Additionally, in situations in
which an individual and an employer were both retaliated against (in
unrelated incidents) for testifying in an ERISA proceeding, the individual
would have a higher causation burden than the employer if Gross and
Nassar were applied.
This example illustrates the inconsistency that would result from such
an application. It also undermines the assertions of the Gross and Nassar
Courts that use of the term “because” in the statute was meant to signal
but-for causation. All four clauses of the ERISA retaliation clause are in
the same provision of the statute.216 It seems highly unlikely that Congress
would want a heighted but-for causation standard for the second of four
clauses in the same provision and only signal so by using the
term “because.”
Exactly which FMLA provision covers retaliation is the subject of a
circuit split, and proves vital in the statutory interpretation of what the
standard should be, as well as analyzing the actual FMLA retaliation
provision.217 The FMLA has three provisions that could constitute a
retaliation prohibition. The first states “[i]t shall be unlawful for any
employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt
to exercise, any right provided under [the FMLA].”218 The second
provision states “[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or
in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any
practice made unlawful by [the FMLA].”219 The final provision states,
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other
manner discriminate against any individual because such
individual (1) has filed any charge or has institute or caused to be
instituted any proceeding, under or related to this subchapter;
(2) has given, or is about to give, any information in connection
with any inquiry or proceeding relating to any right provided
under [the FMLA]; or (3) has testified, or is about to testify, in
any inquiry or proceeding relating to any right provided under
215. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 277–78 (2009) (“[N]othing in [Title VII] requires a
freakish rule protecting an employee who reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one
who reports the same discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question.”).
216. 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
217. Compare cases cited infra note 224, with cases cited infra note 225.
218. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).
219. Id. § 2615(a)(2).
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[the FMLA].220
A specific type of retaliation is provided for in § 2615(b).221 It covers
adverse actions taken by employers when employees have filed
complaints or lawsuits or provided information or testimony related to
FMLA rights.222 This is a retaliation clause based on participation.
However, not all instances of FMLA retaliation are covered by this
provision. Many litigants assert that they were retaliated against, not
because they filed a complaint about FMLA rights, but rather for simply
requesting and/or taking FMLA leave.223 This frequent scenario is not
covered by § 2615(b). Some courts have used the FMLA’s opposition
clause, § 2615(a)(2), for scenarios such as this. Specifically, the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have found a retaliation cause of
action under § 2615(a)(2).224 The First, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have
found that § 2615(a)(1) can support a retaliation cause of action.225
Additionally, some courts have found a retaliation cause of action in the
DOL’s FMLA implementing regulations alone.226 The regulations state in
relevant part, “[t]he Act’s prohibition against interference prohibits an
employer from discriminating or retaliating against an employee or
prospective employee for having exercised or attempted to exercise

220. Id. § 2615(b).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coatings, LLC, 747 F.3d 419, 434 (6th Cir. 2014)
(reversing summary judgment for the employer in a case where the employee was terminated after
requesting FMLA leave for congestive heart failure); Pereda v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., Inc.,
666 F.3d 1269, 1276–77 (11th Cir. 2012) (reversing motion to dismiss where employee was fired
after requesting FMLA leave but before taking it).
224. See Yashenko v. Harrah’s NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 546 (4th Cir. 2006); Haley v. All.
Compressor LLC, 391 F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 2004); Bryant v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 538 F.3d 394, 402
(6th Cir. 2008); Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2007); Kauffman v. Fed. Express
Corp., 426 F.3d 880, 884 (7th Cir. 2005); Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d
1164, 1170 (10th Cir. 2006).
225. See Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 160 n.4 (1st Cir. 1998) (discussing that
retaliation for exercising rights under the FMLA can be read into § 2615(a)(1)); Pulczinski v. Trinity
Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 1006 (8th Cir. 2012) (“The textual basis for such a claim [in
which an employer takes adverse action against an employee because the employee exercised rights
to which he is entitled under the FMLA] is not well developed in our cases, but the claim likely arises
under the rule of § 2615(a)(1).”); Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1124 (9th Cir.
2001) (concluding that § 2615(a)(2) and § 2615(b) do not cover adverse actions an employee suffers
simply because they have taken FMLA leave; rather, this cause of action is covered under
§ 2615(a)(1)).
226. See Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 2012)
(concluding that neither § 2615(a)(1) nor § 2615(a)(2) expressly prohibits employers from
terminating employees for exercising or attempting to exercise FMLA rights, but a U.S. Department
of Labor regulation has interpreted the sum of these two provisions as mandating this result).
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FMLA rights.”227 Some courts have used the regulation alone to find a
retaliation cause of action without reference to a specific statutory
provision.228 In 2009, the DOL amended the FMLA’s implementing
regulations and addressed the issue in the preamble to the amended
regulations. The relevant portion of the preamble reads as follows:
[T]he Department proposed in paragraph (c) to state explicitly
that the Act’s prohibition on interference in 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1)
includes claims that an employer has discriminated or retaliated
against an employee for having exercised his or her FMLA rights.
Section 2615(a)(1) makes it unlawful for an employer to interfere
with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise
any right provided for under the Act. Although section 2615(a)(2)
of the Act also may be read to bar retaliation . . . , the Department
believes that section 2615(a)(1) provides a clearer statutory basis
for § 825.220(c)’s prohibition of discrimination and retaliation.229
At least one circuit has changed course regarding the applicable section
of the FMLA that pertains to adverse actions against employees who have
exercised or attempted to exercise FMLA leave rights.230
The choice of which provision of the FMLA covers retaliation is
important, not because of what the text says, but because of what it does
not say. In both Gross and Nassar, the Court harped on the term “because
of” in the ADEA and Title VII. In Gross, the Court posited that the term
“because of” in the ADEA meant “by reason of” or “on account of,” and
this justified a but-for causation standard.231 The Nassar Court noted the
importance the Gross Court placed on “because of.”232 This term also
appears in Title VII. Interpreting the term “because of” to signal a
requirement of but-for causation is something the Court itself previously
warned against in Price Waterhouse, cautioning, “[t]o construe the words
‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for causation’ . . . is to

227. 29 CFR § 825.220(c) (2019).
228. See, e.g., Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 146–47 n.9 (3d Cir. 2004)
(“Even though 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) appears to be an implementation of the ‘interference’
provisions of the FMLA, its text unambiguously speaks in terms of ‘discrimination’ and ‘retaliation,’
and we shall, of course, apply it in a manner consistent with that text.”).
229. Family and Medical Leave Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 67934, 67986 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. pt. 825).
230. See Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2017)
(“We have in the past suggested that retaliation claims fall under § 2615(a)(2) . . . . We now hold that
FMLA retaliation claims like [the plaintiff’s], i.e. terminations for exercising FMLA rights by, for
example, taking legitimate FMLA leave, are actionable under § 2615(a)(1).”).
231. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009).
232. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 350 (2013).
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misunderstand them.”233 Notably, the term does not appear in the FMLA
retaliation provision.234 This absence means that the portion of the text
upon which the Court relied in its previous decisions to apply the
heightened causation standard should not be part of the
FMLA’s interpretation.
The term “because of,” which appears vital to the statutory
interpretations rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court in both Gross and
Nassar, does not appear in either § 2615(a)(1) or § 2615(a)(2). The
FMLA’s retaliation language is broader and spans three provisions of the
statute.235 It should be read to encompass a mixed motive cause of action.
The term “interfere” in the statute is broad enough to encompass
retaliation claims as well as non-retaliation claims. Despite the routine
application of Title VII case law to FMLA cases, courts should be wary
of using Nassar as the default causation standard, given the textual
differences in the statutes. The Supreme Court has warned of the dangers
of blindly applying precedent from one employment statute to another.
In Gross, the Court stated that the differences in statutory text between
Title VII and the ADEA prevented the Court from applying Price
Waterhouse, Title VII precedent, to the ADEA.236 Likewise, in Nassar,
when applying the Gross but-for standard to Title VII retaliation claims,
the Court noted that “[g]iven the lack of any meaningful textual difference
between the text in this statute and the one in Gross, the proper conclusion
here, as in Gross, is that Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the
desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment
action.”237 While the ADEA and Title VII may not have textual
differences, Title VII and the FMLA certainly do. These variances
mandate a different interpretation of the retaliation causation standard.
Finally, USERRA is unique among these statutes because a motivating
factor retaliation causation standard is actually written into the statute.238
However, the text of the statute illuminates a flaw in the Gross and Nassar
Courts’ rationale concerning but-for causation. The USERRA retaliation
provision reads, in relevant part, as follows:
An employer may not discriminate in employment against or take
any adverse employment action against any person because such
person (1) has taken an action to enforce a protection afforded any
person under this chapter, (2) has testified or otherwise made a
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989).
See 29 U.S.C. § 2615.
Id.
Gross, 557 U.S. at 175 n.2.
Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352.
38 U.S.C. § 4311(b).
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statement in or in connection with any proceeding under this
chapter, (3) has assisted or otherwise participated in an
investigation under this chapter, or (4) has exercised a right
provided for in this chapter. The prohibition in this subsection
shall apply with respect to a person regardless of whether that
person has performed service in the uniformed services.239
The statute also states in 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(2)240 that an employer has
violated section (b) if protected activity is “is a motivating factor in the
employer’s action.”241 It also states:
An employer shall be considered to have engaged in actions
prohibited—
(2) under subsection (b), if the person’s (A) action to enforce a
protection afforded any person under this chapter, (B) testimony
or making of a statement in or in connection with any proceeding
under this chapter, (C) assistance or other participation in an
investigation under this chapter, or (D) exercise of a right
provided for in this chapter, is a motivating factor in the
employer’s action, unless the employer can prove that the action
would have been taken in the absence of such person’s
enforcement action, testimony, statement, assistance,
participation, or exercise of a right.242
The provision contains an interference clause and a participation, both of
which are prefaced by the term “because.”243 Application of the Gross and
Nassar rationales to USERRA would mean that Congress intended butfor causation to apply. That is, the Gross and Nassar opinions would lead
one to believe that but-for causation should apply due to the term
“because.” However, the next paragraph of the retaliation provisions
makes it clear that this was not the intent of Congress, as it explicitly states
that the retaliation provision is violated if protected activity is a

239. Id. (emphasis added).
240. The complete text of 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(2) states:
An employer shall be considered to have engaged in actions prohibited under subsection (b), if
the person’s (A) action to enforce a protection afforded any person under this chapter,
(B) testimony or making of a statement in or in connection with any proceeding under this
chapter, (C) assistance or other participation in an investigation under this chapter, or
(D) exercise of a right provided for in this chapter, is a motivating factor in the employer’s action,
unless the employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the absence of such
person’s enforcement action, testimony, statement, assistance, participation, or exercise of
a right.
Id. § 4311(c)(2).
241. Id.
242. Id. (emphasis added).
243. Id. § 4311(b).
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motivating factor in the adverse action.244 USERRA is evidence that
Congress’s use of the term “because” does not signal its desire to invoke
a heightened causation standard. Indeed, in the wake of the Monroe
decision,245 Congress explicitly wanted the statute to be a response to the
Court’s imposition of heightened causation.246 Nevertheless, it still used
the word “because” in the statute.
The table below shows the resulting standard if courts interpreted the
term “because” in retaliation provisions of minimum labor standards
statutes to require but-for causation.
Table 1:
Results of Application of Gross and Nassar to Minimum Labor
Standards Statutes
Statute

Clause

Causation
Standard

FLSA

Participation Clause

But-for

OSHA

Participation Clause
Opposition Clause
Employee Interference Clause
Employee Participation Clause
Employer Interference Clause
Employer Participation Clause
Opposition Clause
Participation Clause
Interference Clause
All Clauses

But-for
But-for
Motivating Factor
But-for
Motivating Factor
Motivating Factor
Motivating Factor
But-for
Motivating Factor
Motivating Factor

ERISA

FMLA

USERRA

C.

Inconsistent Results

An application of Gross and Nassar to the federal minimum labor
standards statutes discussed above would result in but-for causation being
244. Id. § 4311(c)(2).
245. Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549 (1981).
246. H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, pt. 1, at 24 (1993) (“To the extent that courts have relied on dicta from
the Supreme Court’s decision in Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 559 (1981), that a
violation of this section can occur only if the military obligation is the sole factor (see Sawyer v. Swift
& Co., 836 F.2d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 1988)), those decisions have misinterpreted the original
legislative intent and history of 38 U.S.C. 2021(b)(3) and are rejected on that basis.”).
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applied to FLSA, OSHA, and ERISA’s individual participation clause,
while motivating factor would be required for the FMLA, ERISA
contributing employers, ERISA’s interference clause, and USERRA.247
The inconsistent standards may lead to illogical results.
Four examples illustrate this problem. First, there is the issue of
servicemember leave under USERRA and servicemember caregiver leave
under FMLA. Employment leave for servicemembers is codified in a
different statute from leave for those who care for servicemembers.248 The
former is protected by USERRA, while the latter is covered by the
FMLA.249 Suppose a father took FMLA leave to care for his daughter, a
member of the National Guard who was wounded while deployed. Both
the father and daughter are demoted upon their return to work for their
taking of leave. Both file retaliation claims with DOL, and both are
subsequently terminated, prompting each to file a retaliation claim. The
father files under the FMLA’s participation clause, and the daughter files
under USERRA’s participation clause. The father would have to prove the
heightened but-for standard of causation, while the daughter would simply
have to show that her taking of protected leave was a motivating factor.
The fact that Congress granted both servicemembers and their caregivers
a statutory right to leave illustrates the value Congress placed on the
functions of both. It is difficult to believe that Congress sought to institute
a higher burden of proof for the person who is needed to care for the
servicemember than for the servicemember herself, both because it is
unlikely that is what Congress intended and it would be nonsensical to do
so.
The second example is that of nursing mothers under the FLSA and
FMLA. The FLSA requires employers to provide employees breaks for
the purpose of expressing breast milk for a nursing child and a private
place, other than a bathroom, that may be used by the employee while
expressing milk.250 The FMLA provides for unpaid leave for the birth or
adoption of a child and to care for the child. Enforcement of the
breastfeeding provisions of the FLSA has already proven difficult,251 and
requiring a but-for causation standard for retaliation claims under the
provision would dilute enforcement even more. Application of Gross and
Nassar to both the FLSA and FMLA would result in a but-for causation
standard for all FLSA retaliation claims and a motivating factor standard

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See supra section II.B.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654; 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4334.
Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654, with 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4334.
29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(B).
See Meghan Boone, Lactation Law, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1827, 1840 (2018).

Steele (Do Not Delete)

2020]

12/14/2020 11:09 PM

PROTECTING PROTECTED ACTIVITY

1929

for FMLA participation clause claims. Hence, nursing mothers who are
working (i.e., not on family leave), yet are being denied their FLSA rights
to breaks for expressing milk would have a more arduous burden in
pursuing a retaliation claim than a nursing mother who was on FMLA
leave and retaliated against for taking the leave. In other words, if an
employer wanted to commit retaliatory acts against nursing mothers,252
the mother who chose to work while nursing and forego family leave
would be worse off in a retaliation claim than the one who took the leave.
Moreover, such a case could invoke claims under minimum labor
standards legislation and under employment discrimination statutes. If the
working nursing mother (i.e., the one not on family leave) was treated
differently because she needed to express milk, she would have a viable
status-based claim under Title VII.253 Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of
1991, the status-based claim would only apply a motivating factor
standard.254
A third example involves heightened protection for reporting violations
that endangers an individual’s pension under ERISA compared to lower
protections for similar violations under the FLSA. Because the FLSA and
ERISA would have different causation standards after the application of
Gross and Nassar, employees alleging retaliation under the FLSA for
exercising rights or participating in proceedings related to their wages
would have a heightened causation standard to meet than employees who
allege retaliation under ERISA for exercise of rights or participating in
proceedings related to pension benefits.
A fourth and final example concerns having heightened protection from
employer retribution for taking leave to recover from a workplace injury
under the FMLA than from reporting the hazardous workplace conditions
that led to the injury in the first place pursuant to OSHA. It is unlikely that
Congress intended for individuals who need to take leave from work
because of an on-the-job injury to have less protection from retaliation
than an employee who reports the unsafe working conditions that led to
the injury.

252. For examples of FLSA retaliation cases involving nursing mothers, see generally Eddins v.
SSP Am., Inc., No. 4:12-CV-00177-JEG, 2013 WL 12128683, at *2 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 31, 2013);
Swenson v. Falmouth Pub. Schs., No. 2:19-CV-00210-GZS, 2019 WL 4739667, at *3 (D. Me. Sept.
27, 2019).
253. See EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425, 428–30 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that
adverse employment action against a female employee because she was expressing milk violates
Title VII); see also Falk v. City of Glendale, No. 12-CV-00925-JLK, 2012 WL 2390556, at *4 (D.
Colo. June 25, 2012) (noting that Title VII could support claims concerning lactation if other
coworkers were allowed to take breaks to use the restroom while lactating mothers were prohibited
from expressing breast milk).
254. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
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Additionally, unlike the inconsistency that results with respect to
differences between statutes, some of these inconsistencies are actually
within the same statute, as is the case with ERISA and the FMLA.255 The
fact that there are different causation standards depending on which clause
of the same retaliation provision a person files under is unreasonable.
Application of Gross and Nassar to minimum labor standards statutes
would lead to very inconsistent results and should be avoided.
III. THE BUT-FOR CAUSATION STANDARD LACKS SUPPORT
AS A MATTER OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
This Part examines the numerous canons of statutory interpretation that
support imposition of a lower causation standard for minimum labor
standards statute retaliation claims. It begins with an explanation of how
the Gross and Nassar Courts failed to apply the plain meaning rule. It then
discusses textual integrity and extrinsic sources canons.
A.

Failure to Appropriately Apply the Plain Meaning Rule

The use of the term “because” does not plainly signal but-for causation.
The concept of causation itself is not even plainly signaled from the text
of the ADEA or Title VII. Rather, causation was judicially added as part
of the legal framework for these statutes. The Court, not Congress,
imported causation into workplace statutes. To assert that the use of the
word “because” not only signals a causation requirement, but the specific
requirement of but-for causation does not constitute a plain meaning.
Moreover, the crux of the plain meaning rule is commonality. A recent
empirical study illustrates the Court’s failure to aptly apply the plain
meaning rule. Using a sample size of 1,486 participants, the study
presented participants with a fact pattern modeled from one of three recent
federal court decisions.256 Gross was one of the decisions.257 After reading
the fact pattern, participants answered questions pertaining to causation
and blameworthiness.258 Results showed that even where but-for
causation was not present, 74% of the participants still found the casual
language of the statute to be satisfied.259 This lends support for the idea
that the but-for test is too restrictive in that most ordinary people found
255. See supra section II.B.
256. James A. Macleod, Ordinary Causation: A Study in Experimental Statutory Interpretation, 94
IND. L.J. 957, 995 (2019).
257. Id. The other decisions were Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) and United States
v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2014).
258. See Macleod, supra note 256, at 997.
259. Id. at 999.
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that a result occurred because of conduct even in the absence of but-for
causation.260
The plain meaning rule dictates that words are to be given their
ordinary meaning, unless doing so would result in absurdity.261 Absurdity
is a high threshold to meet. An example of absurdity can be found in the
case of United States v. Kirby,262 a case in which a sheriff who arrested a
mail carrier for murder was charged with violating a statute that prohibited
knowingly and willfully obstructing mail delivery.263 However, even
when absurdity does not result the Court has stated that unreasonableness
will serve as a substitute. In United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns,264
the Court stated,
When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however,
this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act.
Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not
produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one “plainly
at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole” this Court
has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words.265
While the results of application of Gross and Nassar to labor standards
legislation may not rise to the level of absurd, they are both futile and
unreasonable because such application negates the retaliation provisions
that are meant to safeguard the protected activity.
B.

Textual Integrity Canons

The next canon requires that each statutory provision be read in the
context of the whole statute. This is commonly known as the Whole Act
Rule.266 The origins of the canon date back to 1850,267 and it has been
frequently invoked for over a century and a half.268 It requires that when
260. Id. at 999–1000.
261. For a history of the absurdity doctrine, see Linda D. Jellum, But That Is Absurd! Why Specific
Absurdity Undermines Textualism, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 917 (2011).
262. 74 U.S. 482 (1868).
263. Id. at 483.
264. 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
265. Id. at 543.
266. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J. BRUDNEY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 675 (5th ed. 2014).
267. See United States v. Boisdoré’s Heirs, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850) (“In expounding a statute, we
must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy.”).
268. See Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017)
(noting that interpretation of a phrase in a statute is not confined to a single sentence when the text of
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a court is interpreting a provision of a statute it looks to the entire statute,
as well as the statute’s object and policy.269 Application of this canon to
minimum labor standards statutes would require courts to consider the
retaliation provision in relation to the statute at large, and recognize the
object of the retaliation provision in the entire statutory scheme. But-for
causation allows violation of the statute with no attaching liability, so long
as the illegitimate motive—interfering with the exercise of statutory rights
or investigation of other statutory violations—is paired with a legitimate
motive.
Another textual integrity canon is the presumption against hiding
elephants in mouseholes. The doctrine was named after a quote from the
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns270 opinion in 2001. In it, Justice
Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority wrote, “Congress, we have held,
does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague
terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants
in mouseholes.”271 Though the name is fairly modern in origin, the
concept is not.272 Instituting a heightened but-for causation standard
merely through the use of the term “because” would be hiding an elephant
in a mousehole. It is implausible that Congress would signal a heightened
standard through use of a term that is used in countless other statutes that
do not even have a causation requirement. It is even more improbable that
Congress intended to signal different causation standards for separate
clauses within the same retaliation provision through the use of the term
“because.”
C.

Extrinsic Source Canons

Extrinsic source canons pertain to agency deference and continuity in
law. They include deference to agency interpretation of statutes they
enforce as a canon, examining informal agency interpretations such as
those in handbooks to interpret the statute, and the borrowed

the whole statute is instructive to its meaning); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987)
(recognizing that interpreting a statute requires looking to the provisions of the law as a whole);
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) (noting that it is fundamental that a section of a
statute not be read in isolation from the context of the entire statute and interpreting legislation
requires looking at the entire statute and its object); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270,
285 (1956) (stating that expounding a statute requires looking to the provisions of the whole law).
269. Boisdoré’s Heirs, 49 U.S. at 122.
270. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
271. Id. at 468.
272. See generally FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
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statute rule.273
1.

Deference to Agency Interpretation

The DOL has promulgated regulations for OSHA and the FMLA that
speak specifically to the applicable causation standard.274 These
regulations ought to be afforded deference pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.275 In Chevron, the Court articulated a test for determining
when an agency’s interpretation of a statute ought to be afforded
deference.276 Before the test can be implemented, the doctrine established
in United States v. Mead Corp.,277 also referred to as Chevron Step Zero,
must be satisfied.278 Mead requires, as a threshold matter, that before an
agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference, it must be clear that Congress delegated authority to said
agency to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency’s
interpretation was created pursuant to that authority.279 Chevron requires
that a court determine whether Congress has spoken directly to the
specific question at issue.280 If Congress has been silent or ambiguous,
then Chevron requires an inquiry as to whether the DOL’s interpretation
is reasonable with respect to both interpretation and policy.281
Both the OSHA and the FMLA regulations concerning the causation
standard qualify for Chevron deference. Congress granted the DOL
rulemaking authority under OSHA.282 The OSHA regulation addressing
retaliation gives individuals the option of proving retaliation by showing
that protected activity was either a substantial reason for or a but-for cause
of the adverse action.283 Many courts have afforded Chevron deference to
the DOL’s OSHA regulation.284 For instance, in Perez v. Lloyd Industries,
273. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841–44 (1984);
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 266, at 866–67 (discussing the borrowed statute rule).
274. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.6(b) (2019); id. § 825.220(c).
275. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
276. Id. at 842–43.
277. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 226–27.
280. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
281. Id. at 843.
282. 29 U.S.C. § 655.
283. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.6(b) (2019).
284. See, e.g., Perez v. Clearwater Paper Corp., 184 F. Supp. 3d 831, 842 (D. Idaho 2016) (citing
the DOL regulation to hold that “[c]ausation is established where the protected activity was a
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Inc.,285 a district court in Pennsylvania addressed an employer’s argument
that but-for causation was required in OSHA retaliation claims pursuant
to Gross and Nassar.286 The court held that the employer’s argument that
the but-for causation was required for OSHA retaliation claims ignored
the “clear controlling regulatory language.”287
With respect to the FMLA, the statute not only gives the DOL the
authority to create regulations, but it mandated that the agency do so.288
Hence, requirements of Mead are satisfied. Congress has been silent on
the issue of the causation standard to be used in FMLA retaliation cases.
None of the provisions under § 2615 dealing with interference speak to
causation. Moreover, the statute does not contain the “because of”
language that the Court thought dispositive in Gross and Nassar.289
Additionally, the DOL’s interpretation is a reasonable one. The agency
has interpreted the broad interference language of the FMLA as
prohibiting the use of the exercise of FMLA rights in making any negative
employment decisions whatsoever. Although the Court has made it clear
that it leans towards but-for causation with respect to workplace law
retaliation,290 the Court should not substitute its judgment in place of the
agency that Congress duly authorized to fill any gaps in the statute. The
Court has acknowledged that congressional authorization to engage in the
rulemaking process is a very good indicator of delegation that merits
Chevron deference.291
2.

In Pari Materia Rule

In addition to agency interpretations, another extrinsic source canon of
statutory construction that supports a lower causal standard than but-for
cause in minimum labor standards retaliation claims is the in pari materia

substantial reason for the adverse employment action”); Perez v. USPS, 76 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1188
(W.D. Wash. 2015) (finding that the Secretary of Labor proved causation because he demonstrated
that the employee’s protected activities were a substantial reason for the adverse actions); Perez v.
Renaissance Arts & Educ., Inc., No. 8:12-CV-514-T-MAP, 2013 WL 5487097, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept.
30, 2013) (noting that proving the protected activity was a substantial reason for the adverse action
establishes causation).
285. 399 F. Supp. 3d 308 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
286. Id. at 321.
287. Id.
288. 29 U.S.C. § 2654 instructs the Secretary of Labor to prescribe regulations for the FMLA.
289. See supra section II.B.
290. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 347 (2013) (stating that but-for
causation is the default rule, and Congress is presumed to have incorporated but-for causation absent
an indication to the contrary in the statute).
291. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
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canon.292 According to this canon, when similar provisions or terms are
found in comparable statutes, there is a presumption that the provisions or
terms should be applied the same way.293 The fundamental rationale for
the canon is that ensuring harmonization of two similar areas of law assists
in making the law make sense.294
The Supreme Court has noted several times that the decision to borrow
statutory text in a new statute is a “strong indication that the two statutes
should be interpreted pari passu,”295 and the Roberts Court has frequently
relied on one statute to interpret another.296 The in pari materia rule is
buttressed by other canons of construction. For instance, the Borrowed
Statute Rule provides that when Congress borrows provisions of a statute,
it adopts the interpretations of that statute.297 While this canon typically
applies when one jurisdiction models its statute on that a previous
jurisdiction, it can also apply to statutes within the same jurisdiction.298
Indeed, the presumption underlying the canon is much stronger within the
same jurisdiction.299
Application of the in pari materia and borrowed statute canons to the
minimum labor standards retaliation cases suggests that motivating factor
should be the causation standard used when comparing the FLSA, OSHA,
ERISA, and FMLA to their predecessor statute—the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA).300 Passed in 1935 to quell disruption of
industry commerce by labor-management disputes, the NLRA endowed
employees with the right to organize and required employers to

292. For a detailed discussion of the in pari materia doctrine, see Anuj C. Desai, The Dilemma of
Interstatutory Interpretation, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 177 (2020).
293. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 266, at 866 (citing Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining
Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859,
873 (2012)).
294. Desai, supra note 292, at 193–94.
295. Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam); see also Smith v. City of
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (noting that when Congress uses the same language in two statutes
that have similar purposes, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the
same meaning in both statutes).
296. See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era:
An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 234, 236 (2010) (finding that of the
Roberts Court relied on other statutes in statutory interpretation 39.2% of the time during its first three
and a half terms).
297. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 266, at 866–67.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169).
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bargain collectively with employees through employeeselected representatives.301
The NLRA contains a retaliation provision that has an interference
clause and a participation clause.302 The interference clause makes it an
unfair labor practice “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [the NLRA].”303 The statute’s
participation clause makes it an unfair labor practice “to discharge or
otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges
or given testimony under [the NLRA].”304
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has interpreted the
NLRA’s interference clause to require only motivating factor causation.
In Wright Line,305 the NLRB held that motivating factor was the requisite
causation standard in NLRA retaliation cases under the interference
clause.306 The NLRB’s standard in Wright Line was approved by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.,307 a
NLRA mixed motive retaliation case in which the Court held that shifting
the burden to the employer to prove the same decision defense was
reasonable. In Transportation Management, the Court stated,
The employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive that is
declared illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk
that the influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated,
because he knowingly created the risk and because the risk was
created not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing.308
Both the NLRB309 and courts310 have applied the motivating factor
standard from Wright Line to retaliation claims under the NLRA’s
participation clause, despite the clause’s use of the term “because.” As the

301. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
302. See id. § 158(a)(1).
303. Id. § 158(a)(1); see also Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1092 (1980).
304. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (emphasis added).
305. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980).
306. Id. at 1089.
307. 462 U.S. 393 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs,
Dep’t of Lab. v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994).
308. Id. at 403.
309. See generally Taylor & Gaskin, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 563 (1985).
310. See S. Freedman & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 713 F. App’x 152, 157–58 (4th Cir. 2017) (applying
motivating factor as the causal standard in a NLRA participation clause retaliation claim); NLRB v.
McCullough Env’t Servs., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 931 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying the motivating factor
standard to a retaliation claim under the NLRA’s participation clause); Am. Model & Pattern, Inc. v.
NLRB, No. 85-6060, 86-5049, 1987 WL 37138, at *4 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 1987) (holding that an
employer violates the NLRA’s participation clause if an employee’s participation in a NLRB
proceeding is a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse action against the employee).
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predecessor statute to almost all minimum labor standards legislation, this
interpretation of the causation standard as requiring only motivating factor
causation should be imported from NLRA retaliation cases to other
minimum labor standards retaliation cases using the in pari materia canon.
IV. INTERPRETING RETALIATION STATUTES AGAINST
COMMON LAW BASELINES
This Part discusses the unique intersectionality of private law and
public law in the employment and retaliation jurisprudence. As discussed
above, imputation of Gross and Nassar reasoning to federal minimum
labor standards legislation can have consequences that lead to confusion,
irrationality, and inconsistency among and within the statutes.311
Employment law is uniquely situated at the intersection of public law
and private law. While there are differing definitions of what constitutes
public law and private law, many scholars agree that constitutional law,
criminal law, and administrative law are considered areas of public law,
while torts, contracts, and property are considered areas of private law.312
Many may characterize employment law generally as private law
addressing the rights of individual employees, this Article contends that
both antidiscrimination employment statutes and minimum labor
standards legislation constitute public law. Because federal courts
interpret workplace statutes against a backdrop of tort law (private law),
this interpretation should be done with the public values that underlie the
statute in mind.313
A.

The Judiciary’s Prevailing Private Law Approach

Tort principles have been part of the Supreme Court’s employment law
jurisprudence for over half a century. The Court has long subscribed to
the notion that when Congress creates a “federal tort” it does so against
the general background of tort law.314 Numerous scholars have been
critical of the Court’s importation of tort doctrine into employment

311. See supra sections II.B, II.C.
312. See Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking the Boundaries Between Public Law and Private Law for
the Twenty First Century: An Introduction, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 125, 125 (2013); Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Private Law Statutory Interpretation, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 949 (2019).
313. For a full discussion of the role of public values in statutory interpretation, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989).
314. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613–14 (2009); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 68–69
(2007); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
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cases.315 However, there have been instances in which the courts’ reliance
on the law of torts for statutory interpretation has served the purposes of
the statutes well. Examples include application of tort rules concerning
remedies to recovery under Title VII and importation of discovery rules
into the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.316 Tort doctrine is not completely
divorced from retaliation law, as both torts and retaliation provisions are
concerned with deterrence of bad behavior and compensation to some
degree. However, if courts are going to invoke tort principles in statutory
interpretation of retaliation statutes, the courts should make sure the tort
principles align for the statute at issue. The Gross and Nassar Courts
failed to do this when they used negligence doctrine to interpret an
intentional offense.
The Gross opinion quotes Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts in
support of its application of but-for causation to the ADEA.317 The Gross
Court notes that according to Prosser and Keeton, “[a] act or omission is
not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event would have
occurred without it.”318 However, this proclamation addresses negligence,
and it is inapposite to apply it to retaliation, which is an intentional
offense.319 Consequently, it is inapposite to apply it to intentional
offenses.
The Court has noted that retaliation is intentional. In Jackson v.
Birmingham Board of Education,320 the Court stated, “[r]etaliation is, by
definition, an intentional act.”321 Unlike a negligent tortfeasor who will
only be held liable for foreseeable consequences, an intentional tortfeasor
will be liable for essentially every result stemming from the tortious
conduct, whether the result is direct or indirect.322 Intentional tortfeasors
should bear the risk of the plaintiff getting a windfall because the
intentional tortfeasor created the risk. Intentional tortfeasors have more
315. See generally Deborah L. Brake, Tortifying Retaliation: Protected Activity at the Intersection
of Fault, Duty, and Causation, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1375 (2014); William R. Corbett, What Is Troubling
About the Tortification of Employment Discrimination Law?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1027 (2014); Sandra
F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2014); Charles A. Sullivan, Is There a Madness to
the Method?: Torts and Other Influences on Employment Discrimination Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079
(2014).
316. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
317. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–77 (2009).
318. Id. at 176–77 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)).
319. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173–74 (2005) (“Retaliation is, by
definition, an intentional act.”).
320. 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
321. Id. at 173–74.
322. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 227 (2d
ed. 2011).
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liability; however, this is not reflected in the Gross and Nassar decisions.
While there is normative scholarship asserting that the analytical
framework for discrimination should not require intent,323 currently intent
is required. For courts to mandate a showing of intent in a disparate
treatment analysis, which is the analysis used for retaliation claims, yet
use negligence theory to inform that analysis, is incongruous. Limiting
liability of intentional retaliatory actions by employers does a disservice
to retaliation provisions in statutes. Retaliation prohibitions in minimum
labor standards statutes serve a vital public interest. Hence, allowing
employers who engage in retaliatory conduct against employees to escape
liability for intentional conduct by taking advantage of legal doctrine
designed to address negligent conduct implicates public policy.
B.

Minimum Labor Standards Legislation as Public Law

Courts tend to treat workplace disputes as though they operate solely
in the private sphere. In other words, these disputes are viewed as private
disputes between employer and employee. This perspective is flawed
because it fails to consider the impact these disputes may have on the
public at large.
While some may consider laws that convey individual workplace
protection rights as private rights, this notion ignores the larger societal
purpose of the laws. Indeed, many workplace laws are grounded in
constitutional principles. It is axiomatic that employment discrimination
laws are grounded in equal protection principles. However, minimum
labor standards statutes are similarly anchored. While it is easy to perceive
the public law origins in certain legislative arenas, such as the child labor
provisions of the FLSA, others may not be so obvious. All of the minimum
labor standards laws are promulgated pursuant to Congress’s power under
the Commerce Clause and some pursuant to its general welfare power.
Additionally, the Court has held that the FMLA caregiver provisions were
based on gender discrimination and should be considered prophylactic
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.324
A common thread that runs through minimum labor standards

323. See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1059
(2017) (proposing a theory of discrimination based on recklessness); Melissa Hart, Subjective
Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 743 (2005) (opposing the
dichotomy between conscious discrimination for which courts provide a remedy and unconscious
discrimination for which courts do not, but should under Title VII); David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 899 (1993) (arguing that discrimination is more
akin to negligent conduct than intentional conduct, and courts should recognize a negligence theory
of discrimination in addition to the intentional doctrine).
324. Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003).
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legislation is economic security. Economic security of both the worker
and the worker’s family is important individually and collectively. The
import of having a minimum wage and overtime pay cannot be overstated.
Additionally, benefits like pension plans and healthcare are equally vital
to economic security. In fact, they are so vital that the federal government
sought to insure pension plans through the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation and the ACA provisions.325
Additionally, retaliation and whistleblowing provisions generally are
aimed at serving the public interest. The primary categories these laws are
intended to serve are industrial peace, civil rights, public health and safety,
and protection of the public treasury.326 The relationship between child
labor and health is well documented.327 These categories that are generally
applicable to all retaliation and whistleblowing statutes also coincide with
the purposes of minimum labor standards legislation. The FLSA worked
in tandem with the NLRA to raise wages and facilitate peace between
labor and management.328 The Supreme Court has also noted a correlation
between an eight-hour workday and public health.329 Upon the
introduction of the bill that would become the FLSA, Secretary of Labor
Frances Perkins noted that in states where working hours were reduced to
eight hours per day, public health improved.330 Moreover,
interdisciplinary research has documented the health effects of long
working hours.331 Having a minimum wage protects the economic
325. Adam E. Cearley, The PBGC: Why the Retiree’s Traditional Life Raft Is Sinking and How to
Bail It Out, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 181, 183–84 (2006).
326. See DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 8 (2d ed. 2004).
327. See generally Todd Postol, Public Health and Working Children in Twentieth-Century
America: An Historical Overview, 14 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 348 (1993); Susan H. Pollack, Philip J.
Landrigan & David L. Mallino, Child Labor in 1990: Prevalence and Health Hazards, 11 ANN. REV.
PUB. HEALTH 359 (1990) (suggesting work-related injury is a significant public health problem in
children and suggests additionally that illness related to toxic exposure may be a problem in
working children).
328. See generally Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 18
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19 (2000).
329. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (noting that the denial of a living
wage to workers is detrimental to their health and well-being).
330. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937: Hearing on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200 Before the S. Comm.
on Educ. & Lab. & the H. Comm. on Lab., 75th Cong. 188 (1937).
331. See Haiou Yang, Peter L. Schnall, Maritza Jauregui, Ta-Chen Su & Dean Baker, Work Hours
and Self-Reported Hypertension Among Working People in California, 48 HYPERTENSION 744, 744–
45 (2006); A.E. Dembe, J.B. Erickson, R.G. Delbos & S.M. Banks, The Impact of Overtime and Long
Work Hours on Occupational Injuries and Illnesses: New Evidence from the United States, 62
OCCUPATIONAL & ENV’T MED. 588, 592 (2005) (finding that working overtime increased an
employee’s likelihood of on-the-job injuries by 61%); Allard E. Dembe, Ethical Issues Relating to
the Health Effects of Long Working Hours, 84 J. BUS. ETHICS 195, 196 (2009) (exploring the ethical
implications of long working hours and health challenges).
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security of American workers and their families. Millions of dollars are
spent on programs that promote the economic security of families
including Early Head Start and Head Start, Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families, Community Services Block Grant, and Federal-State
Unemployment Insurance Programs.332 If employers cannot terminate,
demote, or take other adverse employment actions against employees who
exercise statutory rights, working American families will be selfsustaining and will need fewer public resources. Furthermore, the Court
has recognized the public interest served by the FLSA.333
OSHA promotes public health and safety, as it protects the safety of
workers, and in some cases, third parties. ERISA falls under the public
health and safety and public treasury protection categories because of its
provisions relating to health care coverage and pension regulations. The
FMLA implicates civil rights, treasury protection, and public health. The
statute clearly lists its equal protection aims with respect to gender
discrimination.334 It states that one of the purposes of the statute is to
balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families “in a
manner that, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, minimizes the potential for employment discrimination on
the basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available . . . on a
gender-neutral basis.”335 Moreover, it has implications with respect to race
that are less pronounced. Women of color with caregiving responsibilities
are often treated less favorably than white women with caregiving
responsibilities.336 USERRA implicates national security and treasury
protection. The statute’s stated purpose is “to encourage noncareer service
in the uniformed services by eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages
to civilian careers and employment which can result from such service.”337
If employers are allowed to discriminate against uniform service
members, it could discourage participation in the armed services, which
could impact national security. Additionally, if these service members are

332. GENE FAUK, KAREN E. LYNCH & JESSICA TOLLESTRUP, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45097,
FEDERAL SPENDING ON BENEFITS AND SERVICES FOR PEOPLE WITH LOW INCOME: IN BRIEF (2018).
333. See, e.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706–07 (1945) (stating that the FLSA
is “a recognition of the fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as between employer and
employee, certain segments of the population required federal compulsory legislation to prevent
private contracts on their part which endangered national health and efficiency and as a result the free
movement of goods in interstate commerce”).
334. See Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (“The FMLA aims to protect
the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace.”).
335. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4).
336. Stephanie Bornstein, Work, Family, and Discrimination at the Bottom of the Ladder, 19 GEO.
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 39–40 (2012).
337. 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1).
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unable to earn a living because of employment discrimination, they may
need treasury-funded public assistance.
The fact that individual employees may not relinquish their rights under
the minimum labor standards statutes through contract supports the
interpretation that these laws constitute public law. Courts have repeatedly
held that even when a statutory right is conferred on a private party, it is
not waivable if it is in the public interest.338 For example, Brooklyn
Savings Bank v. O’Neil,339 an FLSA overtime case, addressed whether an
employee can waive his rights under the FLSA.340 The Court held that
“[w]here a private right is granted in the public interest to effectuate a
legislative policy, waiver of a right so charged or colored with the public
interest will not be allowed where it would thwart the legislative policy
which it was designed to effectuate.”341
The Court has explicitly prohibited the waiver of FLSA rights.342 The
DOL issued agency guidance in 2016 stating that the DOL will not
approve an settlement agreements that restrict an individual from
participating in protected activity.343 Included among the provisions that
the DOL will not approve are provisions that require an individual to
waive his or her right to receive a monetary award from a governmentadministered whistleblower award program for providing information to
a government agency.344 Additionally, the FMLA implementing
regulations expressly prohibit employees from waiving, and employers
from inducing them to waive, their prospective FMLA rights.345 Most
federal courts allow waiver of procedural rights under USERRA, but

338. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (refusing to enforce
waiver of Title VII rights because waiver “would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind
Title VII”); Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 320 U.S. 356, 361 (1943) (declining to enforce
an agreement between a carrier and shipper to extend the statute of limitations beyond the period
contained in the Interstate Commerce Act because the purpose of the provision was to protect the
public interest); Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982)
(“Recognizing that there are often great inequalities in bargaining power between employers and
employees, Congress made the FLSA’s provisions mandatory; thus, the provisions are not subject to
negotiation or bargaining between employers and employees.”); Pereira v. State Bd. of Educ., 37 A.3d
625, 654 (Conn. 2012) (“[When] a law seeks to protect the public as well as the individual, such
protection to the state cannot, at will, be waived by any individual . . . .”).
339. 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
340. Id. at 700.
341. Id. at 704.
342. Id. at 706–07.
343. Memorandum from Maryann Garrahan, Dir. of Whistleblower Prot. Programs, to Reg’l
Adm’rs & Whistleblower Program Managers 1 (Aug. 23, 2016).
344. Id. at 2.
345. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2019).
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maintain that substantive USERRA rights cannot be waived.346
Finally, the fact that many of the minimum labor standards statues
allow for criminal penalties in addition to civil ones also serves as
evidence that they are public law. Criminal law is considered public
law.347 While the FLSA, OSHA, and ERISA are primarily civil in nature,
they also provide for criminal penalties in addition to the civil penalties.
Conviction of a willful violation of the FLSA can result in a maximum
fine of $10,000, imprisonment for a maximum term of six months, or
both.348 Likewise, OSHA authorizes criminal penalties when a willful
violation of an OSHA rule, order, standard, or regulation causes an
employee’s death.349 The penalties include a maximum fine of $10,000
and maximum prison sentence of six months upon conviction.350 Both the
fine and prison term maximums double if the individual has a previous
conviction for the same offense.351 ERISA also provides for criminal
penalties.352 Before the statute was enacted, the U.S. criminal code made
theft or conversion of benefit plan assets,353 falsification of plan
documents,354 and improper payments to plan officials355 criminal
346. See Wysocki v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 607 F.3d 1102, 1107 (6th Cir. 2010) (allowing for the
waiver of employee’s procedural rights under USERRA); Vahey v. Gen. Motors Co., No. 11-CV00661, 2012 WL 9390844, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2012) (holding that substantive USERRA rights
cannot be waived, but procedural rights can); Aull v. McKeon-Grano Assocs., Inc.,
No. 027526 (HAA), 2007 WL 655484, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2007) (noting that statutes of limitations
are not substantive rights under USERRA, and allowing waiver).
347. See Balganesh, supra note 312, at 949.
348. 29 U.S.C. § 216(a).
349. Id. § 666(e).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. 18 U.S.C. § 664 provides that:
Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or converts to his own
use or to the use of another, any of the moneys, funds, securities, premiums, credits, property, or
other assets of any employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefit plan, or of any
fund connected therewith, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
18 U.S.C. § 664.
354. 18 U.S.C. § 1027 states that:
Whoever, in any document required by title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (as amended from time to time) to be published, or kept as part of the records of any
employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefit plan, or certified to the administrator
of any such plan, makes any false statement or representation of fact, knowing it to be false, or
knowingly conceals, covers up, or fails to disclose any fact the disclosure of which is required
by such title or is necessary to verify, explain, clarify or check for accuracy and completeness
any report required by such title to be published or any information required by such title to be
certified, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id. § 1027.
355. 18 U.S.C. § 1954 prohibits plan officials from receiving, agreeing to receive, or soliciting “any
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offenses. ERISA criminalized certain reporting and disclosure
violations,356 prohibited coercive interference with plan and statutory
rights,357 and prohibited certain convicted persons from holding
plan positions.358
Retaliation provisions in minimum labor standards legislation are not
concerned with horizontal interaction between private parties. Rather,
they are part of the overall regulatory enforcement scheme. Many
workplace law statutes, including federal minimum labor standards laws,
rely on private enforcement of public law.359 It is part of the regulatory
scheme Congress deliberately established. There are many advantages to
private enforcement of retaliation laws, including the better positioning of
employees to identify retaliation and an ability to pursue litigation
independent of the budget Congress has allotted to the applicable
administrative agency.360
To incentivize enforcement, Congress has created numerous
mechanisms, including attorneys’ fees awards, punitive damages, and
private rights of action.361 However, the courts’ implementation of a
heightened but-for causation standard for retaliation claims may deter
private parties from bringing claims. Employees, who are already at a
disadvantage due to inferior knowledge of employer practices, now have
to meet a heightened causation standard in retaliation cases. Even for
employees who may not understand this burden at the outset, there would
be attorneys who do. This could make it difficult for some employees to
secure counsel.
Private law protects private interests and is based in principles of
personal autonomy and laissez-fair.362 Minimum labor standards
legislation is designed to work against coercive market forces that may
promote low wages, exploitation of child labor, wage theft, pension theft,
hazardous working conditions, and burdensome leave requirements.
fee, kickback, commission, gift, loan, money, or thing of value because of or with intent to be
influenced with respect to, any of the actions, decisions, or other duties relating to any question or
matter concerning [the] plan.” Id. § 1954.
356. 29 U.S.C. § 1131.
357. Id. § 1141.
358. Id. § 1111.
359. For a thorough discussion of the role of private enforcement in public law, see J. Maria Glover,
The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1137 (2012).
360. See David Kwok, The Public Wrong of Whistleblower Retaliation, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1225,
1242 (2018).
361. Glover, supra note 359, at 1151.
362. See generally Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for
Individual Parties: The Tug of War Continues, 77 UMKC L. REV. 647 (2009).
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Market forces give employers an incentive to discourage employees from
taking leave, which is one of the reasons minimum labor standards are so
vital. The but-for standard ensures the employer receives the windfall,
rather than the employee.363 This is a proposition that the Supreme Court
has supported in the past.364 This reasoning is applicable to all mixedmotive claims including FMLA retaliation claims. Congress made any
kind of retaliation based on requesting or taking FMLA leave unlawful,365
not just retaliation that divests someone of a job. An employer’s showing
that the employee would have been terminated anyway does not
extinguish liability. It simply should exclude certain remedies.
In interpreting public law, courts should be wary of using private law
as a backdrop. Invocation of private law principles to interpret public law
is not new, and there are a myriad of statutes for which the courts have
done so.366 Courts have substantially invoked private law norms to
interpret public statutes and have diluted the efficacy of the statutes as a
result.367 If courts are going to import common law principles into
statutory interpretation, they need to look for guidance in areas of the
common law that similarly deal with the juncture of public law and private
law, particularly given the influence of the at-will employment doctrine.
C.

Lessons from a Common Law Tort at the Intersection of Private
Law and Public Law: Wrongful Discharge in Violation of
Public Policy

If courts are going to import tort principles into employment law, they
need to be cognizant that employment law represents the intersection of
public and private law. They should look to a common law tort
jurisprudence that already addresses the intersection of public and private
law, specifically the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy.
Because Congress is often silent on the causation standard to be applied
363. See Andrew Verstein, The Failure of Mixed-Motives Jurisprudence, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 725,
784–85 (2019).
364. See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401–03 (1983), abrogated on other grounds
by Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Lab. v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S.
267 (1994).
365. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b).
366. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257–58 (1978) (noting that the common law of torts
has developed a set of rules regarding compensation for injuries, and declaring that there rules provide
the starting point for interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (stating that Congress expected the courts to interpret the Sherman Act’s
broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition).
367. See Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358,
1364 (1982).

Steele (Do Not Delete)

1946

12/14/2020 11:09 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1891

to the retaliation provisions of statutes, courts are left with the task of
interpreting the statute to determine which causation standard should be
used. Courts have long used the common law as a backdrop against which
to interpret statutes. While this Article does not argue that this practice is
erroneous, it does assert that courts should only use portions of the
common law that are appropriate to achieve the purpose of the statute,
particularly when the purpose of the provision at issue is to undergird the
statute itself. While a statute’s purpose cannot be divorced from its text, it
is important that everyday words like “because” not be used to justify
major changes to retaliation jurisprudence that affect the efficacy of
the statute.
The at-will employment doctrine holds that an employee can be
terminated for “a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.”368 Atwill employment is the default rule in forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia.369 Montana is the only state that requires an employer to have
“good cause” to terminate a non-probationary employee.370 However, the
at-will employment doctrine does have exceptions, most of which are
statutory.371 Anti-discrimination laws are one exception.372 Retaliation for
violation of federal minimum labor standards statutes are another.373
Wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is a common law
exception.374 It follows that courts seeking to import tort principles into
workplace law would look to the wrongful discharge tort as instructive.
The tort375 of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is

368. See Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 1977).
369. At-Will Employment Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 15, 2008),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx
[https://perma.cc/67MV-FYDU].
370. Id.
371. Constitutional exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine also exist for public employees.
See generally Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
372. At-Will Employment Overview, supra note 369.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Some jurisdictions allow a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under
contract theory, not tort theory. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Ark.
1988) (noting that an exclusive contract theory of the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy is most appropriate).
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recognized in forty-five U.S. jurisdictions.376 Alabama,377 Florida,378
Georgia,379 Louisiana,380 Maine,381 and New York382 do not recognize the
cause of action. Many of the jurisdictions that recognize the tort apply a
lower causation standard than but-for causation.383 Causation standards in
376. Nancy Modesitt, Wrongful Discharge: The Use of Federal Law as a Source of Public Policy,
8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 623, 623 (2006).
377. Alabama does not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
Its courts have reasoned that such a claim does not exist because it would “abrogate the inherent right
of contract between employer and employee.” Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131
(Ala. 1977); see also Salter v. Alfa Ins. Co., 561 So. 2d 1050, 1052 (Ala. 1990) (refusing to create a
cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy because doing so would “overrule
nearly 70 years of existing Alabama case law, and because the suggested basis of ‘public policy’ is
too nebulous an underpinning to justify adoption of such a rule” (quoting Hinrichs, 352 So. 2d
at 1132)).
378. See Kelly v. Gill, 544 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that in the absence
of a statute granting a property interest or an employment contract, employment is terminable at the
will of either party without cause and an action for wrongful discharge is not permitted); Brown
Jordan Int’l Inc. v. Carmicle, Nos. 0:14-CV-60629, 0:14-CV-61415, 2015 WL 6123520, at *6 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 19, 2015) (applying Florida law and holding that “Florida does not recognize a common law
cause of action for wrongful or retaliatory discharge” (quoting Saavedra v. Univ. of S. Fla. Bd. of
Trs., No. 8:10-CV-1935-T-17TGW, 2011 WL 1742018, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 6, 2011))), aff’d, 846
F.3d 1167 (11th Cir. 2017).
379. See Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 250 S.E.2d 442, 443–44 (Ga. 1978) (finding that in the absence
of a contract, employment is at will and does not support a cause of action against the employer for
alleged wrongful discharge); Jellico v. Effingham Cnty., 471 S.E.2d 36, 37 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that employee who was fired for refusing to certify building that were not complaint with
the building code could not recover because in Georgia, an at-will employee cannot bring an action
against his employer for wrongful discharge from employment, and employers are permitted to
discharge employees, regardless of motives, without liability).
380. See Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So. 2d 637, 638 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (deciding that
there is no wrongful discharge when an at-will employee is fired); Jackson v. E. Baton Rouge Par.
Sch. Bd., 393 So. 2d 243, 245 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that at-will employees may be dismissed
“by their employer at any time, for any reason, and the employer does not incur liability for
the discharge”).
381. Maine has declined to recognize the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
However, it leaves open the possibility for recognition of such a claim. See MacDonald v. E. Fine
Paper, Inc., 485 A.2d 228, 230 (Me. 1984) (“[W]e decline, on the record presently before us, to decide
whether this jurisdiction recognizes a common law action for retaliatory discharge in circumstances
where public policy is being contravened. We need only decide that the record demonstrates
conclusively that no public policy has been violated by [the employee’s] discharge.”); Larrabee v.
Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97, 100 (Me. 1984) (dismissing the plaintiff’s wrongful
discharge claim but noting that it “do[es] not rule out the possible recognition of such a cause of action
when the discharge of an employee contravenes some strong public policy”).
382. See Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 87 (N.Y. 1983) (“This court has not
and does not now recognize a cause of action in tort for abusive or wrongful discharge of an employee;
such recognition must await action of the Legislature.”); Horn v. N.Y. Times, 790 N.E.2d 753, 759
(N.Y. 2003) (noting that New York courts have consistently declined to create the tort of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy).
383. See supra section III.C; see, e.g., VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906, 920 (Alaska 1999)
(holding that a motivating factor standard should be used for wrongful discharge claims in Alaska);
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wrongful discharge cases range from the sole cause standard to the
contributing factor standard. However, most jurisdictions that recognize
the tort use a substantial motivating factor, motivating factor, or

Murcott v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 9 P.3d 1088, 1089 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (using substantial motivating
factor as the causation standard in wrongful discharge claims under Arizona law); Sterling Drug, Inc.
v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385–86 (Ark. 1988) (holding that wrongful discharge claims in Arkansas
are viable under contract, not tort, theory, and that “termination by the employer of a contract of
employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best
interests of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment
contract” (quoting Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974))); Cronk v.
Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, No. 90CA0666, 1992 WL 161811, at *5 (Colo. App. Apr. 2, 1992)
(applying substantial motivating factor as the causation standard); HAW. JURY INSTR. − CIV. 16.14
(2016) (codifying “substantial or motivating factor” into Hawaii court rules as the applicable
causation standard in wrongful termination in violation of public policy cases); First Prop. Mgmt.
Corp. v. Zarebidaki, 867 S.W.2d 185, 186 (Ky. 1993) (using substantial motivating factor as the
causation standard in Kentucky wrongful discharge cases); Magee v. DanSources Tech. Servs., Inc.,
769 A.2d 231, 253–54 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (applying a motivating factor standard); Goins v.
Ford Motor Co., 347 N.W.2d 184, 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), abrogated on other grounds
by Watassek v. Mich., Dep’t of Mental Health, 372 N.W.2d 617 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (applying a
significant factor causation standard in a Michigan wrongful discharge case); Denoto v. Sears
Imported Autos., No. A11-1355, 2012 WL 1149350, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2012) (“An
employee must demonstrate that his discharge was ‘motivated by his good faith refusal to violate the
law.’” (quoting Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refin. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. 1987))); Fleshner
v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 86 (Mo. 2010) (holding that “contributing factor” is the
causation standard for wrongful discharge cases in Missouri); Weidler v. Big J Enters., Inc., 953 P.2d
1089, 1095 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding New Mexico jury instructions setting forth an element
of retaliatory discharge as “protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in his discharge
from employment”); Brooks v. Stroh Brewery Co., 382 S.E.2d 874, 878 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (using
substantial factor as the causation standard for wrongful discharge cases in North Carolina); Miracle
v. Ohio Dep’t of Veterans Servs., 157 Ohio St. 3d 413, 2019-Ohio-3308, 137 N.E.3d 1110, 1113
(defining the causation element of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy as requiring a
showing that “the plaintiff’s dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public policy”);
Bostwick v. Atlas Iron Masters, Inc., 780 P.2d 1184, 1188 (Okla. Ct. App. 1988) (applying a
substantial motivating causation standard in a retaliatory discharge case); Hinton v. Designer
Ensembles, Inc., 540 S.E.2d 94, 97 (S.C. 2000) (using “significantly motivated” as the causation
standard in a South Carolina wrongful discharge case (quoting Wallace v. Milliken & Co., 406 S.E.2d
358, 360 (S.C. 1991))); Guy v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 79 S.W.3d 528, 535 (Tenn. 2002) (applying
a motivating factor standard); Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 405 (Utah 1998)
(applying a substantial factor causation standard); Rickman v. Premera Blue Cross, 184 Wash. 2d
300, 314, 358 P.3d 1153, 1160 (2015) (using a substantial motivating factor causation standard in a
wrongful discharge case); Page v. Columbia Nat. Res., Inc., 480 S.E.2d 817, 828–29 (W. Va. 1996)
(applying a motivating factor causation standard); Cardwell v. Am. Linen Supply, 843 P.2d 596, 600
(Wyo. 1992) (requiring protected activity to have “significantly motivated” the discharge in wrongful
termination cases (quoting Buckner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 760 P.2d 803, 807 (Okla. 1988))). But see
Purdy v. Wright Tree Serv., Inc., 835 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a sole cause
standard is applicable to wrongful discharge claims in Indiana); Rivera v. Woodward Res. Ctr., 865
N.W.2d 887, 894 (Iowa 2015) (noting that Iowa uses a determinative factor standard); Allums v.
Valley Bank of Nev., 970 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Nev. 1998) (holding that recovery for retaliatory discharge
under Nevada law may not be had upon a “mixed motives” theory; thus, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that their protected conduct was the proximate cause of their discharge); Shaw v. Titan Corp., 498
S.E.2d 696, 700 (Va. 1998) (noting that Virginia has not adopted a mixed motive standard in wrongful
discharge claims).
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contributing factor standard, all of which are lower than the but-for
standard.384 Although the tort is only applicable in situations in which
there has been termination of employment,385 it is useful with respect to
other adverse employment actions as well.
Courts typically prohibit termination where the employee is discharged
for refusing to commit an illegal act, performing a civic duty, and
exercising a statutory right.386 However, many of the jurisdictions that
recognize the cause of action use a causation standard lower than the butfor standard.387 This common law cause of action and the proliferation of
a lower causation standard should inform the causation standard applied
to retaliation provisions in minimum labor standards legislation.
Exercising a right or claiming a benefit under an employment statute
constitutes protected activity for the purpose of the exemption.388 Though
this at-will employment exception is traditionally used at the state level,
the same rationale would hold true at the federal level with minimum labor
standards legislation. Courts have applied wrongful discharge to the
exercise of many different types of rights.389
Moreover, courts recognize federal law as being the basis for a state
tort. California became the first state to do so in 1980, and other states
have followed.390 Some states place restrictions on the use of federal law
as public policy by requiring that the federal law have some impact on the
citizens of the state.391 Nevertheless, this seems an easy threshold to meet.
Federal minimum labor standards statutes have been used as the
underlying public policy in wrongful discharge claims. For example, the
Supreme Court of Missouri held in Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Institute,
P.C.392 that an employee could recover for wrongful termination after she
was fired for meeting with a the DOL investigator concerning an FLSA
minimum wage complaint.393 The court noted that “[t]he public policy
reflected by the minimum wage law is that employees should be
encouraged to communicate with government labor investigators about
384. See sources cited supra note 383.
385. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 326.
386. At-Will Employment Overview, supra note 369.
387. See sources cited supra note 383.
388. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.02(c) (AM. L. INST. 2015).
389. See, e.g., Kalany v. Campbell, 640 S.E.2d 113, 117–18 (W. Va. 2006) (retaliatory action taken
against an individual who reports allegations of sexual harassment is in violation of the public policy
of West Virginia); Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Iowa 1990)
(alleging retaliatory discharge for pursuing workers’ compensation claim).
390. Modesitt, supra note 376, at 626.
391. See id. at 627.
392. 304 S.W.3d 81 (Mo. 2010).
393. See id. at 97.
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their employers’ overtime compensation without fear of retaliation.”394 In
Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc.,395 a New Jersey court held that OSHA
constituted a valid public policy that could support a wrongful discharge
claim.396 The FMLA was held to be a public policy on which wrongful
discharge could be based in Fischer v. City of Roslyn.397
Despite the prevalence of federal labor standards statutes forming the
basis of wrongful discharge claims, not every statute qualifies. In
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,398 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
ERISA preempts state common law wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy claims.399 The Court held that the claim that the employer
terminated the employee because of the employer’s desire to avoid
contributing to or paying benefits under the employee’s pension fund was
preempted by ERISA, noting that ERISA “shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan described in [the statute].”400
The use of federal labor standards laws, the state equivalents of these
laws, and other policies that concern exercise of state statutory rights (e.g.,
filing a workers compensation claim) show that state courts have
considered the type of protected activity at issue and believed it prudent
not to use a but-for causation standard.
While wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is an exception
to employment at will,401 it is a narrow one. Many courts have placed
limitations on what constitutes public policy. Some courts require the
public policy at issue to be delineated in a constitution, statute, regulation,
administrative rule or decision, case law, or code of professional
conduct.402 Despite the narrow tailoring courts have done with respect to
the tort, the causation standard remains low in most jurisdictions. Courts
have applied a mixed motive causation standard to the tort of wrongful

394. Id.
395. 538 A.2d 1292 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
396. See id. at 1298. Exercise of OSHA rights is recognized as a basis for a wrongful discharge
claim in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Pytlinski v. Brocar Prods., Inc., 760 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Ohio
2002) (allowing an employee to recover when the employee was fired for reporting several violations
of law, including OSHA violations).
397. No. 29361-1-III, 2011 WL 2639931, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. July 7, 2011).
398. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
399. Id. at 140.
400. Id. at 138 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)).
401. Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1655, 1662–63 (1996).
402. Modesitt, supra note 376, at 626.
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discharge in violation of public policy.403 If an employer had dual motives
for terminating an employee, one related to exercise of a statutory right
and another one that would be permissible, a motivating factor standard
should be used in furtherance of public policy and the purpose of
the statute.
CONCLUSION
Federal minimum labor standards legislation plays a vital role in
protecting members of the American workforce, and the private
enforcement regulatory scheme that Congress has created relies on
retaliation prohibitions for its efficacy. It is imperative that these
retaliation proscriptions be given the broadest possible interpretation to
effectuate enforcement of the statute.
The Supreme Court’s decision to require but-for causation in retaliation
claims under federal employment discrimination statutes should not be
transferred to retaliation claims under minimum labor standards statutes.
Interpreting the term “because” in a statute as a signal of congressional
intent to require employee-plaintiffs to prove but-for causation is
incongruent with canons of statutory interpretation. Moreover, it would
lead to less intra-statute consistency and less inter-statute harmony.
The Court’s use of the common law generally, and negligence theory
in particular, as the backdrop against which it interprets claims for
intentional offenses arising from statutes that were created for the express
purpose of abrogating the common law is particularly problematic. This
approach is a symptom of a much large problem—courts view
employment retaliation claims as though they are private disputes
between employee and employer. This perspective fails to recognize the
impact non-compliance with workplace law has on society at large. The
public nature of workplace law retaliation provisions necessitates that
courts consider the public policy behind these retaliation prohibitions.
This holistic consideration supports interpreting the retaliation provisions
to require a causation standard lower than but-for cause.

403. See Marlo v. UPS, 890 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1245 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (applying California law and
holding that a motivating factor causation standard applied to the tort of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy); Shaw v. Titan Corp., No. 96-2143, 1998 WL 277045, at *3 (4th Cir. May
18, 1998) (applying Virginia law and holding the district court did not err in failing to give a but-for
causation jury instruction in a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy case). But see Shaw v.
Titan Corp., 498 S.E.2d 696, 700 (Va. 1998) (noting that a mixed motive standard in wrongful
discharge claims has not been adopted in Virginia).
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